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ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the distinction be­
tween philosophy’ and the experimental sciences. The part 
of the problem studiedt is chiefly centred on the confusion 
which exists between the legitimate field of research of 
the philosophy of nature, and the legitimate orbit of the 
experimental sciences# The separation of these two in­
tellectual disciplines engenders an examination of the 
approach of each to sensible reality, their methods of in­
vestigation, and. the types of knowledge which they achieve.
The problem, in its major aspect, is primarily 
historical, since the majority of the scholars preceding 
Galileo directed their efforts toward the solving of the 
riddles of the universe mainly by philosophical speculation; 
whereas, with the complete enunciation of the experimental 
method, the moderns sought to discover the truth contained 
in reality by the scientific method. Sine® they were un­
aware that the new method was limited to the observable 
and measurable, they firmly believed that they had discovered 
a new means for philosophical speculation. As was inevitable, 
the limits of scientific knowledge were defined by scientists 
such as Mach and Poincare* Unfortunately, they chose to 
reject the possibility of any knowledge which did not lie 
within the scope of the experimental method.
ill
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The cause of traditional philosophy was eclipsed, 
hut not annihilated, The result has been a major division. 
On the one hand, the advocates of Thoraisra, together with 
such prominent men of science as Caldin, Conant, Owen, and 
Thompson have acknowledged the aim Mid validity of tra­
ditional philosophy. On the other hand, the materialists, 
pragmatists, and positivists rejected traditional philo­
sophy and preferred to found their philosophies on the 
theories of science. It has bean at this point, in order 
to salvage any possibility of a philosophy anchored to 
reality, that Maritain and his contemporaries have expan­
ded and applied a study of the nature of philosophy and the 
natural sciences, so that it would be possible to separate 
them, and place each on® in its particular position in a 
well ordered hierarchy of knowledge.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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IINTRODUCTION
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The failure to distinguish philosophy and the ex­
perimental sciences has been one of the major reasons for 
the intellectual chaos to be found in the contemporary world. 
Certain schools of thought, following in the tradition of 
Herbert Spenser and August Comte, have sought to resolve this 
controversial question by denying the validity of traditional 
philosophy and, therefore, rejecting it. For they assumed 
that, since the philosophical method of their Greek and 
Scholastic predecessors had failed to solve certain scien­
tific problems to which it had been applied, it must neces­
sarily be invalidated as a means of discovering any knowledge. 
So, for a long time, the experimental sciences and their 
method remained as the only recognized means for achieving 
a real and valid knowledge. Other schools of thought, 
following in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aqu­
inas, have recognised philosophy, the validity of its pro­
cedure, and its contributions to the growth of man’s know­
ledge. Accordingly, they have tried to re olve t his problem 
by placing philosophy and the experimental sciences in their 
proper positions within a well-defined hierarchy of knowledge, 
and affording to each the recognition to which it is due.
1
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2Since neither of these alternate solutions is universally- 
accepted, the distinction between what is philosophical and 
what is scientific remains as one of the principal problems 
to confront contemporary thought,
If we turn to the historical aspects of the distin­
ction between philosophy and the experimental sciences, we 
will discover that this problem did not arise with the 
Ancients because their whole effort was devoted to the organi­
zation of the philosophy of nature as a science distinct 
from metaphysics, This was achieved with admirable success. 
However, as M, Maritain has pointed out, the Ancients, Aris­
totle and the early scholastics paid for this capital truth 
by a serious intellectual error. They did not ignore the 
detail of phenomena but failed to perceive that this d etail 
of phenomena needed its own specific science which would be 
distinct from philosophy. The Ancients, in their optimism, 
were often prone to arrive quickly at what were oftentimes 
very hypothetical or fallacious explanations for the details 
of sensible nature• Philosophy and the experimental sciences 
were one, and all the sciences concerned with the material 
world were sub-divisions of one unique specific science 
called the philosophy of nature. The philosophy of nature 
was a science to which it belonged at once to analyze cor­
poreal substances and to explain rainbows, and therefore,it 
absorbed all the natural sciences. For the Ancients, the 
detail of phenomena was not the object of a specifically
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
distinct science^, this does not Imply that the episterao- 
logy of the philosophy of the Ancients did not allow for a 
definite relationship of the material sciences with philo­
sophy but simply states that the method peculiar to the ex­
perimental sciences was not elaborated.
the scholastics who followed the Ancients continued 
to direct their efforts toward the separation of the philo­
sophy of nature from metaphysics. they wore also aware of 
the methods of analysis of natural phenomena in certain fields 
such as optics and astronomy} but they did not, in a clear 
cut way, concaive of the possibility of a general science of 
the sensible specifically distinct fro® the philosophy of 
nature. They still continued to interpret natural phenomena 
frost a point of view essentially ordered to an ontological
Jacques marit&in. la Philosophic de la Mature ^
(Paris: Pierre Tequi, 1935) Jl. "Youtefots, rcette"verite
capitals %tait payee che# lea anciens chm  Aristotle lui- 
et ches lea ancient* scholastlques hgalesent au prix 
dlime grave f&ute do precipitation intalleetuella. On ne 
pout pas dire que les anclens talent incurieux du detail 
d m  ph&mumma t ils s*y intereaaant mutant queries ^ modernea, 
mats' ils ntavaient pas vu que ce detail des phenotaenes exige 
sa science i lul sa science speeifique, distincte opecifi- 
queiaont, (ye m  dis pas generiqueaentjf do la philosophic de 
la nature. Pour 1*optimisms des anclcns que ae portalt, tiles 
rapideiaent i. cles raisons d * etro quelquefois tres hypotheblq'Ues 
quand 11 s’&giss&it du detail d m  phfenoraanas, philosophic ...et 
sciences experimentals 'etaxent un seul et imme aavoir, et'. 
toutes les sciences du aond material '©talent des subdivisions 
d,un.e seulo et. unique science soeciflQue qui s’appelerait 
’philosophic naturalist, et laquelle aoourtenaiant i la fois 
1*explication de la substance des corps et 1Texplication de 
l*arc en ciel. On pout dire que pour les ©nolens la phi!©- , 
sophie da la nature" abaorbait toutqa las sciences da la na­
ture. he detail d©s'r”> K  ''pas''“pour eux l*ob-
jet d*une explication scianbifiqu* speciflquement distincte.”
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knowledge. Thus questions which today are called scientific 
did not constitute a specifically distinct discipline but 
were a part of philosophy. This continued to be the case 
right down to the seventeenth century.
The emancipation of the experimental sciences was 
not sudden and abrupt,but gradually moved forward through the 
initial efforts of men such as Francis Bacon, Copernicus, and 
Kepler. Francis Bacon is credited by history2 as one of the 
first advocates of induction, as the principal means to a 
valid knowledge of the sensible. Although modern scientists 
value the contributions of Bacon and his contemporaries, they 
consider that their unique science had its inception with the 
seventeenth century scientist, Galileo. In Galileo, the new 
movement reached further than in any of his predecessors.
With a solid foundation in the new principles, he combined 
the experimental methods of Gilbert with mathematical dedu­
ction and thus discovered and established the true method of 
the physical sciences.3
2 Frank fhilly, A History of Philosophy (New fork: 
Henry % l t  and Company, 1949) , pp.""' 259~26>2.
^ W.C. Dampier - Whetham, A History of Science (Lon­
don : Cambridge University Press, 1^30), p. 141. "In Galileo 
the new spirit went further than in any of his predecessors. 
With a sound grasp of the new principles he learned the 
modern need of concentration and worked out his carefully de­
limited problems in a more completely and methodical way than 
the universal genius of Leonardo could stoop to accomplish... 
But above all he combined the experimental methods of Gilbert 
with mathematical deduction, and thus discovered and estab­
lished the true method of physical science.”
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In general, the new procedure of the natural 
sciences is a combination of the experimental method and 
mathematical deduction. More specifically, Galileo’s theory 
and practice of the scientific method can be expressed in 
three phases. The first is observation; the second is an ex­
plicative hypothesis in the form of a mathematical law; the 
third is the verification of the hypothesis. Galileo, because 
of this contribution, warn the real initiator of scientific in­
duction as the moderns themselves understand it. However, 
mathematics is not in Galileo what it becomes in Descartes, 
where it is the first principle of all natural philosophy^.
The new approach to the explanation of natural pheno­
mena, as instituted by Galileo, adopts the following analy­
tical procedure. In a controlled system, certain observations 
concerning a specified natural process are recorded by means 
of Instruments and measurements. This record of observations 
contains the relevant measured values of those variable magni­
tudes which characterise the process under investigation.
These measured values are carefully examined to determine
^ J. Marechal, Precis D ’Histolre de La Philosophie
Moderns (Louvain: Museu, L^es3airiura,n',l^,3l3),l,, 1, 43'. HSa Theorie
et sa pratique de la methods e perimentale selon les trois 
phases typiques: observation, - hypothdae explicative en 
for,me de la loi mathematique, - verification de I’hypothese.
11 fut par Id le veritable initiateur de 1*induction scien- 
tifique telle que l’entendront les modernes. Pourtant le 
matheraatisme n’est point encore chez Galilee ce qui’il devi- 
endra chez Descartes: la princip® de toute la fhilosophie 
naturelle.”
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6whether or not there is a relationship* If a relationship 
is discovered, it is enunciated by a function which des­
cribes the pertinent relationship* The resultant generali­
zation of explanation is tested as to its validity by an 
application to a particular process within its jurisdiction. 
If successful, it is formally stated as a law.^
With the explicit development of the experimental 
method, the progress of the natural sciences began* Fore­
most among the group of distinguished scholars of science 
who applied the analytical procedure to the investigation 
of the material world was Isaac lewton. Among his many con­
tributions to the growth of the sciences was a functional 
analysis of the experimental method in order to show its 
range of application, dust as Galileo had previously, New­
ton also affirmed that the analytical method deals with ex­
perimentation , the observation of phenomena, and through 
these, the development of general conclusions arrived at 
through induction. Furthermore, the scientist does not 
admit any objections to his conclusions unless they arise 
from other experiments. If no objections arise to nullify 
the conclusion, it is affirmed as universal. Should further 
experimentation reveal something witich in part contradicts
5 This summary of Galileo’s method is based on cer­
tain conclusions reached by Moritz Schlick, Vide Moritz 
Schlick, Philosophy of Nature, trans, Arnethe Von Zeppelin, 
(New Xork: Philosophical Library, 1949), pp. 18-20.
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7the conclusion, it is restated to include those changes 
necessitated by the new discovery. Through the analytical 
procedure, the scientist can determine the simpler consti­
tuents of composite bodies; he can determine the laws of 
motion; and in the universe he can determine causes from 
effects, the general causes from the particular causes, and 
therefore finally arrive at the most general causes^. in 
accord with these principles of procedure, «ewton and his 
contemporaries continued their experimentation and instituted 
many advances in the physical sciences.
It this point It is Interesting to observe that hew- 
ton and his contemporaries did not clearly preceive the uni­
queness of this new scientific knowledge and so believed that 
they were philosophizing; they were completely unaware that 
they were pioneers within the realm of a new intellectual 
discipline, distinct from philosophy. The confidence of 
this new scientific age In its procedure is expressed by 
Cotes, a friend of Newton. So certain were these men of
Isaac uewton, Phllosophta “atnralis. Trincioia Mathe­
matics (London: 1686), hlcT'Tl" "^rop. 2, pT' 237. ‘ ’^ttetHodus 
anaiyticus est experimenta capere, phaenomena observare, in- 
degu#'conclusiones -enerales induction® inferre, nec ex adverse 
ullas objectiones adraittere, nisi quae vel ab experimentis
vel allis certis veritatibus desuraanfcur ........  . ........
Quod si ex phaenomenis nihil quod contra opponi possit exori- 
atur eorjclusio inferri poterit universalis. Et si quando in 
experiundo pastes reperiatur qliquid quod a parte contrari 
faciat, turn deura non sine istus exceptionibus affi rmetur con- 
clusio opporteblt. Mac anal si licebit, ex compositis rebus 
ratiocination® colleger® siwplices; ex motibus vires movantes; 
et in universum ©x effect is causes, ex causis oarticularibus 
generales donee ad generalissimus tandem sit deventum."
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ascience that they were engaged in a new mode of philosophical 
speculation that they completely rejected the doctrine of 
Aristotle and the Peripatetics as barren and invalid* 
Furthermore, they believed that through this synthetic and 
analytical method the laws and forces of nature could be 
deduced from certain selected phenomena, and that this method, 
in its broadest extension, would provide the means through 
whiCh the causes of all things could be derived from the 
simplest principles possible
At this point in history a reversal has arisen in 
the position of philosophy and the experimental sciences.
On the one hand the Ancients had considered philosophy and 
the natural sciences as one intellectual discipline principally 
because they had failed to perceive that the detail of
? A. Cotes, "Preface to the Second Edition," Isaac 
Newton, Mathematical Principles, trans. A. %tte, rev. F* Ca- 
jori {BerHey'WmLii 1 ' ' ve'rsity of California Press, 1946), 
p. xx. "The sum of the doctrine of the schools derived from 
Aristotle and the Peripatetics is heroin contained. They af­
firm that the several effects of bodies arise from the par­
ticular natures of those bodies; but whence it is that bodies 
derive those naturef, they do not tell us, and therefore tell
us nothing .............................  . . . . . . . . . .
There is left then the third class which profess experimental 
philosophy. These Indeed derive the causes of all things fro® 
the most simple principles possible, but then they assume no­
thing as a principle that is not proved by phenomena. They 
frame no hypothesis, nor receive them into philosophy other­
wise than as questions whose truth may be disputed. They pro­
ceed therefore, in a twofold method synthetical and analytical. 
From some selected phaenoiaena they deduce by analysis the 
fofces of nature and the more complete laws of forces, and 
from thence by synthesis shew the constitution of the rest.
This is the incomparably best way of philosophizing."
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phenomena needed its own specific science distinct from 
philosophy and because the experimental method was yet to be 
completely enunciated* Thus all the sciences concerned with 
the material world were considered as subdivisions of the 
philosophy of nature* On the other hand, the scientists of 
the seventeenth century had discovered the principles and 
procedure essential to the study of the detail of phenomena, 
but believed this to be a new method of philosophizing.
Galileo and Newton, together with their contemporaries had 
failed to recognize the unique nature of philosophy and con­
sequently believed their efforts to be philosophical. As a 
consequence, although,the method of the physical sciences had 
been enunciated, all the sciences were included together under 
what was termed experimental philosophy. In the one instance 
the Ancients had absorbed science into philosophy, and now 
philosophy was absorbed into the physical sciences by the 
scientists, and so the confusion between philosophy and the 
physical sciences remained.
With the continuous progress of the experimental 
sciences there was a growing awareness among many scientists 
such as Mach and Poincare" of the unique nature of scientific 
knowledge. Mach, in seeking to analyze scientific knowledge, 
began with sensible nature, which is the object studied in 
the natural sciences. From his investigations Mach concluded 
that the basic elements of nature are sensations. He be­
lieved that primitive man first picked out certain compounds
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of these sensations which were relatively stable, so that 
the first and oldest words are names of things.. This sale-* 
etion was accomplished through the process of abstraction, 
abstractions fro® the environment of things, and fro® their 
continual minor fluctuations which pass unnoticed. Further­
more unalterable things, as such do not exist, but are ab­
stractions. The name is but a symbol for a compound of ele­
ments from whose changes we abstract* A single word is 
assigned, to a whole compound to suggest all constituent ele­
ments at once. Mach emphasises that sensations are not the 
signs of things, rather, a thing is a though symbol for a 
compound sensation of relative fixedness# The world is not 
composed of things but of flux and sensations such as colours, 
tones, and. pressure, and in view of this, it is impossible 
to affirm either permanence of the thing-in-i taelf . Since
ft Ernst Mach, The Science of Mechanics, fcrans., T.J.
McCormack {La Salle, Illinois's"''Spen ffourt iXibXishing Co.,
1942)* PP» 57d-iO* ’’Nature is composed of sensations as its 
elements'. Primatlve man, however first picks out certain 
compounds of these elements - those namely that are relatively 
permanent and of greater importance to him. The first and 
oldest words are names of things. Even here there is an ab­
stractive process, an abstraction from the surroundings of 
things and from the continual minor fluctuations which these 
compounds undergo, which being practically unimportant are 
not noticed. So unalterable thing exists. The thing is an 
abstraction, the name symbol for a compound of elements from 
whose changes we abstract. The reason we assign a single 
word to a whole compound is that we need to suggest all the 
constituent sensations at once, When later we come to remark 
about the changeableness we cannot at the same time hold fast 
to the idea of the permanence of & thing unless we have re­
course to the conception of the thing itself or other such like 
absurdity* Sensations are not the signs of things, but on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Mach was also in agreement with “ewton and Cotes in that he 
considered the experimental method as the only real and valid 
means of knowledge, his episteraology represented a real at­
tempt to discover and analyze the nature of scientific know­
ledge* On this basis he concluded that sensations or the 
detail of phenomena and their connections formed the basis 
for scientific, knowledge and that experience alone is the 
means of this knowledge* The;,natural sciences, according to 
Mach, could not reach any inner natures because they did not 
exist, rather, it discovered and described the connections of 
the not further analyzable elements of sensations.
Since ^&ch realized that the physical sciences are 
limited to a certain approach in their study of natural pheno­
mena, he also sought to fit the terms of the experimental 
sciences to this approach* In trying to achieve this, he 
attempted to purify terns, such as causality, of their pre­
vious philosophical meanings. He considered the concept of 
cause significant only as a means of provisional knowledge 
or orientation. Thus, the scientist, in his investigation 
of an event, must regard phenomena as dependent on one ano­
ther in the same manner as a geometrician regards the sides 
and angles of a triangle as dependent on one another*?.
the contrary a thing is a thought symbol for a compound sen­
sation of relative fixedness. Properly speaking the world is 
not composed of ''things” as its elements but of colours, tones, 
pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call in­
dividual sensations."
9 Ibid., p. 5&2. "The notion cause possesses signi-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Mach*® description of causality expresses a concrete atteraot 
to purify the content of the physical sciences of previous 
philosophical concepts. Because his eoistemology expresses 
an awareness of the limits of scientific knowledge, he marks 
an advance over many of his predecessors*
Henri Poincare", the French mathematician, also made 
a similar study of the physical sciences and formulated cer­
tain conclusions about the nature of the natural sciences.
He considered the physical sciences to be a classification 
of facts which appearances separate., It is a union of these 
facts as though they were bound together by some natural and 
hidden kinship of force. Basically, the physical sciences 
are systems of relationships. Poincare also concluded? that 
the objectivity of the experimental sciences is in these
relationships and these relationships alone have objective
. 10 value ,
ficance only as a means of provisional knowledge or orien­
tation. In any exact or profound investigation of an event, 
the inquirer must regard phenomena as dependent on one another 
in the same way as the geometer regards the sides and angles 
of a triangle as dependent on one another.M
t n
Henri Poincare, The Foundations of Science, trans* 
George Bruce Halstead (Lancaster 'I1®.'i' fhe' Science i’ress, 1946), 
p- 349. wKow what is Science? . . .  It is before all a classi­
fication, a wanner of bringing together facts which appearan­
ces separate though they were bound together by some natural 
and hidden kinship. Science In other words is a system of 
relationships, k o w  «e have just said, it is in the relations 
alone that objective value since it teaches us only 
relations, this is to reason backwards since it is precisely 
these relations alone which can be regarded as objective.”
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Thus*Poincare also affirms the concept that the physical scien­
ces are a study of relationships among phenomena and that 
these relationships ar© gained through experience. There is 
no thought of seeking the inner nature of things,but only 
the discovery and description of phenomena, and their rela­
tionships. These form the basis for a real and valid scien­
tific knowledge.
The thought of !4ach and Poincare' illustrates the 
growing awareness of the specific limits of the experimental 
method as an instrument of knowledge. In its fundamental 
approach, the method has remained the same in its three 
typical phases: observation, an explicative hypothesis, and 
the verification of the hypothesis. But, its limitation to 
the discovery and description of the relationships and the 
detail of phenomena has been clarified. The experimental 
sciences no longer persist in an attempt to solve every pro­
blem in the universe. Thus, the inner natures of things no 
longer form a problem in the physical sciences. This aware­
ness of the unique nature of the natural sciences has seen 
the meanings of terms such as causality removed from their 
previous philosophical definitions and their restatement 
within the limits of the experimental sciences.
Although some of the limitations of the physical 
sciences had been clarified, the confusion between philosophy 
and the experimental sciences still remained:for many of the 
major scientists still considered scientific knowledge alone
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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as real and valid, and recognised only the experimental 
method as an instrument* of knowledge* 1‘hey had failed to 
recognise the unique nature of philosophy and considered 
traditional philosophy as the product of an obsolete pro­
cedure* So strong was the faith of many philosophers in 
the progress of science that they constructed whole systems 
of philosophy on the tenets and interpretations of the phy­
sical sciences.
As Fulton Sheen has pointed out, many philosophers 
to-day take generally accepted results of the experimental 
sciences and wepve them together to fans & picture of reality. 
Furthermore, Sheen noted that all philosophers do not philo­
sophize in the same way, and therefore, philosophy no longer 
seeks truth but forms points of view in line with the latest 
scientific trend. In !Mt®head*s philosophy there in a de­
finite break with the mechanistic view, and the fomstion 
of an org&nlaaie concept of reality. Lloyd Morgan and S. 
Alexander express the view that there is a movement toward 
higher levels of being. In Santayanna there is a naturalism 
which is Platonic in spirit. These are examples of philoso­
phers who are no longer conscious of their own intrinsic 
value. They have no higher mission except to apply the cate­
gories of the material to the spiritual, and the spatio- 
temporal to the eternal*^. In this currant state philosophies
^  Fulton 1, Sheen, Philosophy of Science. (Milwaukee! 
Bruce Publishing Go., 1934)$ pp. 21-24. "To take the gradually
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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became an enumeration of personal points of view based on 
current scientific doctrines. The contention still remains 
that the experimental sciences are the only sound foun­
dations for all knowledge. Traditional philosophy is still 
considered the product of an obsolete procedure.
The development of philosophy as a valid science 
distinct from the experimental sciences has been slow and 
faltering outside the reqlm of the Ihomistic school of 
thought. But it has been materially aided by a definite 
realization of the incomplete picture of reality presented 
by the experimental sciences alone. The result has been 
a concerted effort by men such as Caldin, Owen, Thompson, 
and other prominent scientists to distinguish between 
philosophy and the natural sciences.
accepted results of the various sciences, » . . and to weave them
them together in a picture of reality seems the readiest and
safett way of philosophising. And this is precisely the 
method many philosophers follow today . . .  But not all philo­
sophers synthesis® in the same manner and hence one must not
look for truth but only for "points of view". This makes 
philosophy equivalent to the enumeration of personal points of 
view, and Professor Overstreet is not unwilling to embrace 
this confusion worse confounded. To-day on the contrary in 
one outstanding philosopher after another we find forceful 
expressions of points of view in line with newer trends. In 
Whitehead for example, we discover a definite break with the 
mechanistic views and the formation of an organismc concept 
of reality. In Lloyd Morgan and S. Alexander we are given as 
over against the entropic philosophy of materialism, the view 
of a world in which there is a nlaua toward higher levels of 
being. In bantayanna we find a naturalism that is neverthe­
less Platonic in spirit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
These are but'a few specimens of a philosophy which is 
no longer conscious of its own intrinsic worth, and which so® 
no; higher mission in life for itself, than applying the cate­
gories of material to the spiritual, of the physical to the 
mental and the category of the spatio-temporal to the eternal."
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Within the Thomistie tradition# the philosophy of nature has 
been revitalised and its formal and material objects re­
affirmed to show that there can be e philosophical knowledge 
of natural phenomena* Thonistic philosophy does not seek to 
supersede the proper operations of the scientific wethod; hut 
it does contend that traditional philosophy is a legitimate 
science which gains a knowledge of reality which is as real 
and valid as scientific knowledge.
In its historical aspects the distinction between 
philosophy and the physical sciences has, as a problem for 
contemporary thought, resolved itself into two broad opposing 
groups. The one group, because they have failed to recognise 
the unique nature of traditional philosophy, have rejected 
It as the invalid product of an obsolete method. They have 
maintained since the birth of the experimental method and 
scientific tradition that this procedure alone is capable of 
discovering real knowledge. More recently, the need for 
philosophical speculation has become more apparent. And so 
the philosophers within this group have sought to develop 
their systems by beginning with the most recent accepted 
scientific doctrine, Within their systems they have com­
pletely rejected any concepts of substance, nature or caus­
ality as founded in traditional philosophy. Some of the 
more prominent members of this group are the naturalists, the 
pragmatists, and the dialectical materialists.
The other group recognises the value and purpose of
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traditional philosophy and the value and the accomplishments 
of the experimental sciences* They recognize the incomplete 
picture of reality offered by either science or philosophy 
when alone. Therefore;they seek to form a more complete 
picture of reality by distinguishing between the proper 
field of operations for each; they seek to restare order by 
placing each in its proper position within the hierarchy of 
knowledge and affording to each the recognition to which it 
is due. Most prominent in this group are those philosophers 
such as Maritain, Caldin, Owen* Thompson, Renoirte and others 
who follow in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. 
Since neither of these alternate solutions is universally 
accepted the distinction between what is philosophical and 
what is scientific has remained as one of the principal pro­
blems to confront contemporary thought*
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THE APPROACH OF PHILOSOPHY AHD SCIENCE 
TO SENSIBLE NATUR8
With the development of the material sciences and 
their marked success in the solution of many of the problems 
of nature, there has been a deep and wide-spread influence 
to the point where it has been reflected in a new usage 
and meaning for many terms such as principle, causality, 
and substance. Confusion has resulted from the failure to 
distinguish the legitimate spheres of philosophy and the 
science. In actual fact, it is not, as some thinkers such 
as Comte and Spenser contend, a question of the new scien­
tific meaning for a tern superseding a philosophical meaning 
considered obsolete because it had been defined prior to 
the new approach. Esther, this problem revolves around 
the more basic issue of the distinction between philosophy 
and the natural sciences. In this instance, the distinction 
is concerned with the question of the basic approach of 
each intellectual discipline to the study of reality. With­
in philosophy itself there is one part, the philosophy of 
nature, which is specifically directed to the same object 
of study as the natural sciences. Both are concerned with 
mobile being but each seeks to penetrate it from a differen, 
point of view. The clarification of these points of view 
or formal objects is essential to the clear understanding
IB
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of the line dividing philosophy and the experimental 
sciences.
In regard to these different approaches, it. rlaritain 
has pointed out that in the philosophy of nature the mind 
searches for the inward nature and intelligible reasons of 
things. In following this approach, the mind comes to the 
statement of notions like corporeal substance, quality, 
operative potency, material and formal causes, and other 
similar concepts, although all of these notions apply to 
the world of the observable, they do not describe objects 
which in themselves are representable by the senses, or ex­
pressible in an image or spatio-temporal scheme. These con­
cepts are not defined by observations or measurements which 
can be performed in a particular determined way.
Furthermore, riaritain also indicated that philo­
sophy is ever present in the emperiological explanation. The 
scientist, like every other man, remains invincibly ontolo­
gical, but in this case the ontology is oblique and indirect. 
For a scientist, doing is never sought for itself; it is 
only there as a basis for empiric definition and of physico­
ma thematic al entities-**. Thus, within the philosophy of
' Jacaues war i tain, tea Degres Pat da voir (Paris: 
Descl^e De Brouwer et Cie, 19161", pp. 2M~2$9. "II va 
sans dire qua 1*explication ontologique 1*etre rest© con- 
sidere (pour autant qu’on demeure corame dans le present® 
degre d*abstraction) en ordre aux dorrn^s sensible et ob­
servables. riais lf®spirit s*y porte pour en chercher la 
nature intime et les intelligibles c’est pourquoi il arrive
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nature there is a definite interest in changing being, not 
in the detail of phenomena, but in intelligible being itself 
as mutable or changeable. The material obj ct of the philo­
sophy of nature is mobile being and its formal object is 
the intelligible aspects of mobile being.
As M, Britain has Indicated, the resolution of con­
cepts is made in an infra-philosophie direction within the 
natural sciences. What things are in themselves is not the 
point of interest. What is important are the possibilities 
of empiric proof and mensuration which these things repre­
sent, and the connecting together, according to certain 
stable laws, of the data furnished by these means. Every 
definition must he made no longer *by the nearest gender 
and specific difference1 as in philosophy, but by observable 
and highly determined measurable properties. For the ex­
perimental sciences the possibility of observation and
en suivant cette route a des notions comrae cell© de substance 
corporelle de qualite, de puissance operative de cause raateri- 
elle ou formelle etc., qui tout en se rapportant au stonde ob­
servable ne designent pas des objets qui soient eux-raemes re- 
presentables au sens et fexprlraables dans un image ou dans un 
scheme apatio-temporel; ces objets ne son! pas definis par 
des observations au des mensurations a effectues de telle 
faeon determinee. f ,
3 Dans 1*explication 'empireologlque d*autre part, il y a 
encore comrae nous les notions a*1*instant, de 1*ontologique 
puisqu* il s*agit d’une connaissance intellectuelle, et quo 
pour faire de la science experimentale nous ne devenons pas 
des animaux sans raison; en ce sens le savant comme toute 
homme rests rive a lfontologie mais il n*y a la d*ontologie 
qu1indirectement et obliquement. L’ontologie n*est jamais 
laK degage pour lui mthae, il n*est In' qu*av titre de fondemont 
de representations et definitions empiriques ou d’entitds 
psycio-mathemat iques.M
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measurement replaces the essence of quiddity sought for 
In things by philosophy2* thus, observation and measure­
ment underlie all the natural sciences either implicitly 
or explicitly! the natural sciences have for their material 
object mobile being, and for their formal object the ob­
servable and measurable aspects of mobile being*
Inasmuch as both the scientific and the philosophic 
adopt a different approach to the study of nature, the re­
sult has been a development of new meanings for terms which 
nominally appear alike in the technical 1exikons of both 
philosophy and the experimental sciences* At this point it 
is necessary to guard against the erroneous assumption that 
the scholars prior to the formal statement of the scientific 
method were completely ignorant of the experimental sciences* 
This was not the case* On the other hand, with the complete 
enunciation of the new approach to nature, terms such as
Ibid*« P« 292. "Ainsi done d1un® faqon generals, 
dans tout ce registre eapiriologique la resolution des con­
cepts se fait dans une direction infra-philosophique. Cs 
n*est pas a*ce que lea chosea aont en elles-meae qu* on s* 
interests®; ce qu*import®, «© sont les poasihllities de con- 
station espiriqu® et de mensuration qu’elles representent, 
e’est aussi la possibilite de relier entre ©lies, selon cer­
tain®® lois stables, les donnes fournier par ces constitu­
tions et mensurations; tout® definition deva se fair®, non 
plus *par le genre prochain et la difference specifique, 
rn&is par des propriety's observables et raesurables bien de­
termines dont on assignors dans chaque cas les taoyens de ro- 
perage et d® verification pratique. La possibilit© d*obser­
vation et do mensuration reaplac® ainsi pour un tel savoir 
I’essence ou quiddite cherchee dans les choses par la philo­
sophic*"
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matter, substance, and casuality did receive new scientific 
meaning?,meanings which served to exemplify the characteri­
stics of the scientific method and approach. In some in­
stances, the philosophical and scientific meanings parallel 
each other, but their basic differences can be ascertained 
by a comparison of their usages within philosophy and the 
experimental sciences,
1, Substance
Within Thomistie philosophy, there is a division 
of the modes of being into ten predicaments. These pre­
dicaments themselves are divided into two major parts which 
are substance and accident. In respect to the predicament 
substance, St. Thomas affirmed that ”it belongs to the quiddity 
of essence of a substance to exist or to be not in a sub­
ject *”3 in a further clarification of this philosophical 
concept, Marltain stated that a substance is a thing or 
nature that can exist by itself or in virtue of itself and 
not in another thing, that is to say a previously existing 
subject. Substance signifies a thing existing in itself or 
subsisting, so that it is self-contained as an existent
3 Thomaa Aquinas, Sum iaa Thep.logiae ( O t t a w a :  Impensis
Studii Generalis 0. Pr., 19M>}» Ili,q77, a.l, ad2. "Non
est ergo definitio substantiae: ens per se sine subiecto,... 
sod quidditati seu essentiae substantiae competit habere 
esse non in subiecto.”
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thing^. It should be noted that the classifications of 
the predicaments is not arbitrary, but is fully grounded on 
the various kinds of beings which are found in the real order. 
Therefore, the idea of substance represents something that 
really exists.
In its scientific usage, substance is the term ap­
plied to homogeneous forms of matter - that is, those forms 
that are alike in all their parts. Iron, water, and carbon 
dioxide qualify as homogeneous forms of matter or substance 
because observation shows them to be alike in all their 
parts. Other common materials such as granite, and soil 
show differences in various parts even to superficial ob­
servation, whereas, other materials such as gun powder, or 
pieces of cast iron, while apparently of uniform composition, 
show similar differences of structure when viewed under a 
microscope. Such mixtures are not homogeneous and therefore 
are not substances.^
^ Jacques Maritain, "Introduction Generale A La Philo- 
sophie,” Elements Be Philosophic (Parist Pierre Tequi, 1930), 
1,-160. "Mous dirons done que la substance eat une chose ou 
une nature faite pour exister par sol ou a raison de soi (per 
se) - et non pas en autre chose.'"'^ n'alxo'.‘''‘c1*est3*dlre en 
sujet dega pose dans' i"'*eter 77. Ce que Hesigne le terme sub­
stance c*est une chose faite pour exister en soi ou pour sub­
sister, e’est a dire se tenlr en elle ra^ rae en existant."
5 L. Richardson and A. Scarlett, General College Chemi­
stry (**ew forks Henry Holt and Co., 1947), p. 1. "Substance 
is the term ap lied by chemists to homogeneous forms Of 
matter - that is, those that are alike in all their parts. 
» 7 i r o n ,  water and carbon dioxide are substances. On the 
other hand, such common materials as granite, soil, a mince
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In conformity with the difference between the philo­
sophical and the scientific approach to reality, the term 
substance has two different applications. The philosophical 
meaning of substance is indicative of a mode of being, and 
although it is derived from and is applicable to the world 
of the sensible, it does not describe something which is 
itself representable by the senses or expressible in an 
image or spatio-temporal scheme. The scientific usage of 
substance to denote homogeneous forms of matter is derived 
from the world of the observable, and it is both applied and 
verified by direct observations and measurements made within 
the sensible order.
2. Accident
In its philosophical application, the tern accident 
includes certain diverse modes of being which have a common 
factor. According to St. Thomas an accident is l!a thing to 
which it is due *to be* in another”,^ Therefore its essence
pie. even to superficial observation show differences in 
various parts, whereas other materials such as grains of gun 
powder or pieces of cast iron, while apparently of uniform 
composition, under the microscope show similar differences 
of structure* Such mixtures are not homogeneous, and thus, 
in the strict chemical sense are not substances.”
6 Thomas Aquinas, Goiaaentum In wuator Id boos Senten-
tiarum Marxistrl Petri Lombardi. iV, 'foist. £11.' q'lfo 1 Opera
fomnia.,'ftarmae ed, (Mew York; Rlsurgia, 1949)» ¥11-1 - 632.
*7..“res cui debetur esse in alioj et hoc numquam separatur 
ab aliquo accident®, nee separari potest: quia illi rei quae 
est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper de­
betur esse in alio.”
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is to inhere in another as in a subject. These accidents 
are finite natures which exist or are able to exist and 
manifest reality proportionate to the manner of predication.
Within philosophy, the accident quantity is con­
sidered from the viewpoint of a mode of being; the quantity 
of a mobile being Is its extension. Mobile being is not 
contracted in one point. It has parts soread out in three 
dimensions in space so that one part is in this part of 
space and another part is In another part of space* This 
quantity is defined by St. Thomas as; '’that which is divisible 
into two or ©ore constitutent parts of which each is by 
nature a ’one1 and 'a this*R.7 Quantified being is there­
fore a being which has divisible parts; it is a whole being 
which is actually undivided but capable of being divided 
into parts; It is actually one, a unit, but potentially many.
Outside philosophy, the accident quantity is con­
sidered in two ways. The first, as M. Maritain has pointed 
out, is in mathematics. Here the mind considers the aspects 
of a body which remain when the sensibles are abstracted. 
Numbers and extension are objects of thought which cannot 
exist without sensible matter, but can be conceived without
? Thomas Aquinas, In *'4etaohysicam Ari st ot el 1 sCoa- 
mentaria. ed. M.R. Cathala Ihaurlhi Italia: fiarii E. Marietti, 
IS&5TTK. !•«*. 15, c. 13, p. 310. "Quantum vero dici-
tur quod est divisible in ea quae insunt, quorum utrumque 
aut singulum, unum aliquid, et hoc aliquid, aptura naturn est 
esse.”
ASSUMPTION UNI1/ERSITY W;:’ *
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it. The knowled e of quantity in its relations of order
and measurement forms the intellectual discipline of Biat he­
ft
matics. The second, as -4aritain has indicated, is in 
physi eo-mathematics. Physico-matheiaatics is a scientia 
media, an intermediary science half-way between mathematics 
and empirical natural science, of which the physically real 
forms the subject matter in regard to the measurements which 
it allows us to draw from it, but whose formal object and 
conceptual equipment remains mathematical. It is a science 
which Is materially physical and formally mathematical.9 
In its philosophical aspect, quantity is considered in its 
relation to being as a mode of being. In mathematics It is 
considered In terms of its relations of order and measurement;
J. *iaritain, lea Degree Du Savoir. p. 72. "Celle 
qui rest© quand tout le sensible est torabe - la quantite, nombre 
ou etendu paris en sois objet de pensee qui ne peut pas JSXi- 
ater sans la matiere sensible, mala qui peut etre conca sans 
elle car rien de sensible... C*est le grand domain© de la 
Mathematica. Connaisoance de la Quantite common© telle, selon 
les’ relations dfordre et de raesure qui lui sont propres."
9 pp- 63-64. "C* est une scientia media ...
une science intermediaire, a cheval sur la ruathematique et 
sur le science emperique de la nature, une science dont le 
reel physicque fournit la matiere par les mesures qufil nous 
permet d’aller recueillir en lui, mais dont l*objet formel et 
la proc4&4 de conceptualisation restent mathematiques; disons 
une science materiallement physique et formellement mathe- 
fflatlqua.w This explanation 'by M. >iaritaxn is based on the 
£oll&wing text from St. Thomas, In Boet de Trinit q».5. a.3.
ad. 6. "Quaedam vero sunt media a,"'' quae p r in c i pi a mathemati c a
ad res naturales applicant, ut musica et astrologia quae tamen 
magis sunt affines mathematicis, quia en earum considerations 
id quod est physic!, est quasi material© quod autem raathe- 
matici quasi forraele.”
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within the physico-mathematical sciences, quantity enters 
In as extension and deals with measurements in the terms 
of scalar and vector quantities. In each case the use of 
quantity is determined by the specific approach to nature 
employed by each intellectual discipline.
Within the realm of philosophy, quality is defined 
by St. Thomas, Mas the disposition or modification of a 
substance”0^ -® the qualities disposed the parts of a mobile 
being so that they are in some particular figure, have a 
given colour or manifest other characteristics. Qualities 
are also distinguished as those which are natural and deeply 
rooted in being, and those such as shape which are surface 
qualities. The natural qualities can also be divided into 
active and passive qualities. Her© the proximate principle 
of determining an operation is called active, and the proxi­
mate principle of receiving activity is called passive. A 
quality is usually both active and passive. Figure, however, 
is only passive. It is determined by the termination of the 
extended mobile being in some definite manner.
Within the natural sciences, qualities or properties 
are distinguishing characteristics of the material in ques­
tion. They are observable characteristics which may serve 
for the identification of materials. Under fixed external
Aquinas, In IX *‘*etaphvs. lwct. 1 (Cathala no. 17dS) 
”Qualitas ex hoc quod est quaede® dispositio substantia.”
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condition®, such as properties as odour, colour, density 
(weight per unit volume), freezing point and boiling point
are identifying properties* On the other hand, those 
qualities which apply only to given samples of the material 
In question, such as size and weight, are not useful in 
the identification and determination of this material* 
they are properties confined to a particular specimen and 
are not properties of the substance as auch^-. The scien­
tific concept of property bears a relationship to the 
necessary accident which has a necessary connection with 
the substantial essence and emanates from that essence and 
bears no relationship to the contingent accident*
Sine® the natural sciences deal with the observable 
and the measurable, one of the key points to which their 
investigation is directed, are physical qualities or char­
acteristics of the thing being investigated. In this in­
stance the philosophical definition of the concept quality, 
as a modification or disposition of a thing, must underlie 
the operation of observation and measurement because the 
■natural sciences do not define qualities or properties 
exc pt in a description. JSach quality of a body which is 
ascertained is defined in the t e w  of description and
* L. Richardson and A. Scarlett, Op. cit*, p. 1.
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result; tho description is of the instrument used, and 
the result is a mathematical determination, cade in reference 
to an arbitrary scale which has been developed to show the 
rang® and relationship of the property in question.
Other predicamental accidents, such as relation, 
when, and where, also are individually determined within 
the philosophical and the scientific spheres In accord 
with the different approach of each to reality, -sithin 
philosophy these accidents arc determined as distinct and 
divers® modes of being, each with its own characteristics, 
which cannot exist by themselves but must inhere in an­
other. They represent a division of being which really 
exist®. Within the natural sciences, these accidents are 
determined in the same way aw quality, which is in terras 
of observation and. measurement, or description and. result, 
this is usually accomplished in terms of functions which 
act within a prearranged frame of reference. The values 
assigned to eafc'h accident are both applied and verified 
by direct observations and measurements made within the 
sensible order* In some instances the values assigned 
may become very remote from the real order, but the appli­
cation and verification still holds, although the con­
nection to reality aay be made through an elaborate in­
strument .
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3. Principle
withln philosophy a principle is that from which 
something else takes its rise. In a more specific defini­
tion, St. Thomas has stated that a principle ”is that from
which anything proceeds in any way whatsoever whether in
12being, on becoming, or in knowing.”* The first type of 
principles to be considered is the principle of knowledge.
"A principle of knowledge (is) the basic idea for under­
standing any body of knowledge such as the premises of a 
p r o o f w » t 0 come from something* means to come out of 
a material and that in two ways either out of the most in­
clusive material or out of the l e a s t . T h i s  is an example 
of a real principle. In other cases a definition may be the 
point of initiation and this definition itself i3 a nominal 
principle.
In philosophy an Important distinction is between 
principle and cause. It should be noted from the definition 
of principle that it implies only an order of origin and
3-2 Aquihss, In ¥ Metaphys. lect. 1 (Cathala no. 761). 
"Eeducit omnes praedietos modes ad aliquid commune; et dicit 
quod in commune in omnibus dictis modis est, ut dicatur prin- 
cipiura illud, quod est primus aut in esse rei, sicut prima 
pars rei dictur principiura, aut in fieri rei, sicut orimum 
aovens dictur principium aut in rei cognition©.
^  Aristotle, metaphysics, trans. Richard Hope (hew
Tork: Columbia University Press,"” 1952), Bk. V, lect. 1, ;
1013a; p. B7. \
ll* Ibid.. Bk. ¥, lect. 24, 1023a; p. 116. ,
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does not include any notion of influence derived from 
the principle of those things which follow i « Even the 
common sense notion of cause differs from the notion of 
principle| first as implying a real and positive influence 
on the things of which it is the cause, whereas principle 
implies no such influence; secondly, and because of this, 
cause implies that the caused things are dependent on it, 
but principle implies no such dependence on the part of 
things which follow it; thirdly, cause implies some prior­
ity to the effect, If not in time, at least in nature.
Such priority Is not implied by the notion of principle, 
which signifies merely an order between things, which can 
be present without any priority^. jn effect causes are 
principles, but not all principles are causes.
Within the natural sciences, the terra principle 
retains part of it* philosophical meaning as an origin 
from which something proceeds. A scientific principle, 
in general, does not stand as absolute and universally 
accepted, but rather as relative and changing. For the 
continuous dialectic of the sciences functions in such a 
Manner that a principle may b® obsolete, may be revised in
3*5 fhomas Aquinas, Be Pgincioiis Aaturae. ed. E. 
Mauwelaerts (Louvain: Society of St. h&ui, 1^^), p. 91.
The distinction established between principle and cause is. 
based on the following text from Thomas: MSed causa solum 
dicitur de illo-prlrae ex quo consequitur esse posterioris. 
^nde dictur quod causa est id ex cuius esse sequitur aluid.”
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part, or way be formulated in completely new terns.
Except in a few cases there is no formal agreement as to 
what constitutes a principle* ifhat may be denoted as a 
principle by one, say be termed a theory or law by another. 
In general, the most widely accepted definition of prin­
ciple is a wide generalisation somewhat similar to a law. 
The difference between these two types of generalisations, 
law and principle, is that the ter® law is used in science, 
is applied to a somewhat restricted and precise generali­
sation* The statement that, bodies attract each other in­
versely as the square of their distances and directly as 
their masses, is commonly referred to as a law of gravi­
tation. The concept, that the present diversity of plant 
and animal life is due to a common descent from primitive 
ancestors with modifications in succeeding generations, 
is usually referred to as the principle of evolution. It 
should be noted that no law or principle of science is 
regarded as absolutely proved*^ As a product of the 
sciences, a principle is an explanation drawn from em- 
perical observation, subject to change because of the dia­
lectic natural to the sciences.
16 J.W. Mavor, A Brief Biology (Hew York: Macmil­
lan, 1926), p. 5.
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In conformity with the difference between the 
philosophical and scientific approach to nature, the term 
principle has two applications. The philosophical meaning 
is indicative of being inasmuch at it is that frota which 
something els© takes Its rise. It Is primary and absolute. 
The scientific moaning retains a meaning which is reaines- 
cent of its philosophical predecessor. It functions in a 
relative way within the dialectic of science after it has 
been formulated as an explanation derived from eraperical 
observation. In this respect a theory or law say serve 
as a principle or a principle may serve aa a theory or 
law. The philosopher used the tarns principle in its most 
primary sense where it refers to the thing itself, while 
the scientists employ principles in a secondary way where 
it deals with relationships between physical objects, 
situations and events in so far as they are observable and 
measurable.
4. Causality 
Within philosophy cause usually comes under the 
heading of principle, but while a principle expresses prior­
ity, cause signifies & priority of a particular kind. There 
is an essential connection between, the cause and that which 
follows It, namely the effect. Cause can be defined as a 
principle to which something else owes its existence.
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According to St. Thomas, a "cause brings sonic influence 
on th© H o  be* of a thing c a u s e d . C a u s e  is further 
divided into material cause and formal cause, which arc 
internal; and efficient cause and final cause which are 
external. Th© material cause is that from which a thing 
is made; the formal cause is that which deterr&ines the 
nature of the thing* The efficient cause is that by which 
the thing is produced; the final cause is that on account 
of which the thing is n ad el'*". i'-ach of these causes is a 
primary principle of a real being.
In a scientific application, the tern cause does 
not have the ran :;e of its philosophical counterpart. For 
as the scientist 4ach has stated, the notion cause posses­
ses importance only as a mean© of provisional knowledge or 
orientation* In any examination of an event, the scientist 
must regard phenomena as dependent on one another in the 
same way as the mathematician regards the sides and angles 
of a triangle as dependent on one another19. Furthermore,
1^ Aquinas, In ¥ Hetaphys. lect 1 (Cath&la nos 751, 
749) "noiaen Causa importat influxam quondam ad esse causati:-
lam causa est ad qu&ra de necessitate sequitur."
1^ A. Dougherty, Coamolojty {hew York: Grapraoor dress, 
1952), p. 13.
l^Smst «aeti, The Science of Mechanics* p. 5$2.
"The notion cause poasesaes“lsigni/i cance ’"only'as a means of
provisional knowledge or orientation. In any exact or pro­
found investigation of an event, the inquirer must regard
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in a wore recent statement, Hex Born concluded that 
causality postulate.,* that there are laws by which the 
occurrence of entity B of a certain class d,.-..rends on the 
occurrence of an entity A of another class, Causality as 
a concept, is synonomous with the term, relationship where
">A
the relationship is timeless and spaceless •
In conformity with the different approaches to 
reality th© philosopher uses the term cause in its aost 
primary sense where It is a principle of the thing itself. 
While the scientist uses the term cause in a secondary 
sense where it deals with dependence or relationships be­
tween physical objects, phenomena, situations and events 
in so far as these relationships come within the scope of 
observation and measurement. The natural sciences in 
dealing with principles anc causes are confined to the 
level of the secondary proximate principles and causes of 
classes of mobile being, while within philosophy the prin­
ciple attention is focussed on the first principles and 
causes of mobile being.
the phenomena as dependent on one another in the same way 
that th© geometer regards the sides and angles of a tri­
angle as dependent on one another.w
20 Max Born, Natural Philosophy of Cause and Chance 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Fress, 1 % 9 ) , p. 310.
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Each of these terms which has been considered serves 
to emphasise the basic distinction between the approach of 
the natural sciences and the philosophy of nature. Bach 
approach is primarily interested in reality and both arrive 
at a valid knowledge of nature to the degree which they 
penetrate it, and in harmony with the limitations imposed 
by their different formal objects. It should be noted that 
within the hierarchy of knowledge both the natural sciences 
and the philosophy of nature are restricted to the first 
degree of abstraction, the objects which they undertake to 
investigate can ndther exist apart from matter nor be con­
ceived apart from it. The very nature of this material 
object denies the possibility of ever completely penetrating 
to its inner nature or essence of corporeal substances.
Though it is true that the material object of philo­
sophy and science can be the same, namely ens sensibile. 
the formal object which determines the specific nature of 
th® intellectual disciplines, in the two instances, is 
essehtlally different. The scientist presents nature in 
terms of molecules, ions and other similar constructs within 
a framework of time and space. The philosopher, on the 
other hand, seeks for what, in fact, that matter is which 
is so figured? what, as a function of intelligible being, 
is the nature of corporeal substance. The approach of the 
philosophy of nature is a study of the intelligible aspects 
of corporeal substances. This is distinct from the adentific
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approach which is a study of the observable and measur­
able aspects of corporeal substances.
The approach of the natural sciences is not com­
pletely unilateral because there are divisions within th© 
sciences. Physlco-mathematics provides a pertinent example 
of a scientia media or intermediary science which is half­
way between mathematics and emperical natural science. The 
physically real forms the material object in regard to the 
measurement which it allows the scientist to draw from it 
and the formal object and conceptual procedure remains 
mathematical. It is a science which is materially physical 
since it has its end in sensible, and is formally mathe­
matical.
Outside the realm of physics there are the biological 
sciences which study the spheres of life and organic wholes. 
Although this science resolves its concepts into sensible 
and observable being, it does not undertake the construction 
of a closed universe of the physico-mathematical type; and 
th© fora of deductive explication which it employs is not of 
the mathematical type. Biology also employs physico-chemical 
explications, which are geared to a mathematisation of the 
real, but it remains primarily a science without the universal 
mathematical explanatory deduction of physics.
There are two distinct and valid approaches to the 
study of sensible nature. The one, the philosophy of nature, 
approaches reality or ens mobile in an effort to seek out
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its intelligible aspects, that is, it is emphasizes the 
ens of ena mobile. The other, the natural sciences, which, 
are divided into the physical, the physico-mathematical, 
and the biological sciences, together with their inner 
sciences, approach reality or ena mobile in an effort to 
discover and correlate its observable and measurable aspects, 
that is, it emphasizes the mobile of ens mobile.
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THE KATUHE OP SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
The methods of science depend on basic postulates 
such as the principle of causality, and the law of the 
uniformity of nature. Science uses basic concepts in a 
way which is quite different fron philosophy. In science 
causality does not function in its primary Meaning as a 
principle of the thing itself, rather, it is considered 
in a secondary sense so that it deals with systems of 
relationships within the reals* of the observable and the 
measurable. Accordingly, the physicist Max Dorn, in his 
evaluation of causality, concluded that causality, as a 
basic premise, postulates that there are lavra by which 
the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class is de­
pendent upon the occurrence of an entity A of another class. 
In this instance, an entity can be any physical object, 
situation, phenomenon, or event. A as the cause must b© 
prior or at least simultaneous with the effect B. It is 
also postulated that cause A and effect B must be in spatial 
contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in 
contact*, tlm principle of the. uniformity of nature as a
* Max Born, pp. eft., p. 9-
39
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primary premise of the natural sciences asserts that 
under certain conditions there is a uniformity in the 
activity of mobile beings. As a principle it does not 
infer that every action in nature is completely determined, 
but it does state that there- is an order in nature to the 
degree that it can be successfully investigated, and the 
results tabulated either by statistics of functional re­
lationships2.
To obtain any given relationship the scientist 
employs a specific approach, hhere necessary, the appar­
atus is assembled to reproduce a desired set of conditions 
and to measure the occurrences in a closed system. In 
those branches of the natural sciences where this is not 
possible, the initial part of the procedure is trained ob­
servation. In order to be successful, the observer must 
obtain a composite picture of the object under investigation; 
he must have an extensive knowledge of the previous research 
accomplished in this particular field. Only then can he be 
prepared to discover relationships between phenomena appar­
ently quite remote from, each other^. These requirements
2 For a further discussion of th© principle of the 
uniformity of nature vide Dougherty, op. elt.. pp. 162-166.
3 F.M. Vestaway, Scientific Method (hew York: Hill- 
man-Curl Inc., 1937)* P. I967~....
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for trained observation also apply when direct observation
is replaced by experimentation*
Wherever possible, experimentation is employed.
The object of an experiment is to set up a controlled 
system where only one circumstance is allowed to vary at 
a time. The experimenter, if possible, also seeks to eli­
minate non-essential conditions of the phenomenon under 
investigation. If more than one circumstance is varied 
at th© same time, it is impossible to determine which con­
dition creates the effect, or when .no effect ensues, if 
any of the participating circumstances is completely in­
different^. Therefore, in the first part of the scien­
tific procedure the investigator aims at the determination 
of certain relationships either through observation alone 
or experimentation. These relationships, if they are 
verified by a number of repeated experiments or obser­
vations of the same nature, provide the material for the 
next step, which is the interpretation of these relation­
ships. They for® the basis for a type of reasoning known
as scientific induction.
4 IMi*
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Scientific induction is but one division of in­
duction. In ita widest extension, as P. Goffey has 
pointed out, it also includes the attainment of necessary 
self-evident principles through abstraction, intuition, 
and generalisation. Therefore, induction is any process 
of reasoning which moves from the plane of the concrete 
singular to the plane of ideas, the plane of the univer­
sal^. When parts in question are the singular data of 
sense experience, as they usually are within the natural 
sciences, it is impossible to enumerate them completely 
since the human mind cannot pass in review all of indivi­
dual cases. Therefore, induction, as employed within the 
natural sciences, is incomplete induction, induction by 
incomplete enumeration.
W.R. Thompson in his book, Science and Common Sense, 
has provided an illustration of the function and character­
istics of scientific induction by applying it to a classi-
> P. Goffey, The Science of ^ogic (London; ^ongmans 
Green and Co., 1912), 11,''25. low this simple process 
of abstraction. Intuition., and generalisation by which we 
attainto a knowledgeofself necessary principles, through 
the notions which we abstract from sense experience, is 
sometimes called Induction. But this is using the word in 
such a wide sense as to make it embrace every mental process 
bv which we ascend from or through the particular to the 
u n i v e r s a l . '
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fication of the house-fly. Repeated observations disclosed 
that the House-fly possesses two wings and only two wings 
as a constant attribute, therefore, the House-fly belongs 
to a two-winged species. It also has a complex collection 
of anatomical features which characterise it as a member 
of the family of Muscid flies, further observations of 
flies of this type reveals that, although they differ some­
what, they all have two wings* In general it can be con­
cluded that Muscid have two wings, or that the &uscid is
fta two-winged type0. Furthermore, Thompson ihdicated that 
this example is an ascending induction, the movement from 
the particular to the general, and that it is possible to 
reverse the process in a descending induction, the movement 
from the general to th© particular* This is the example 
given for & descending induction. "The Muscid is a two­
winged. Wow the Blow-fly, the Green-bottle, and the House­
fly are all Muscids. Therefore, th© Green-bottle is a two­
winged insect.
In the same discussion, Thompson also reached cer­
tain conclusions about the characteristics of the inductive
6 The example cited is based upon . tt. Thompson, 
Science and Common Sense (London; hongmans Green and Co., 
193*?), pp. 30-31. ‘
7 Ibid*, p. 32*
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process as an instrument within the natural sciences. It 
is an ascension .front particular cases to the concept of a 
nature common to them, which expresses itself in every in­
dividual* accordingly, the truth attained does not pertain 
merely to a collection of individuals but has a general value. 
As an argument or proof, the inductive conclusion, in roost 
instances, cannot load to complete certainty, since it de­
pends on an insufficient enumeration of cases. Although 
the inductive process gains a knowledge about the nature of 
things, it does not gain absolute certainty because there 
is no guarantee that the constancy of the properties obser-
s#
ved is an essential feature of material things . Inductive 
science, though often unconscious of its limitations, can 
only roach conclusions which are more or less probable. On 
occasion, the probability In favour of a generalisation is
Ibid., pp. 31*32. ''In the inductive process we 
thus pass ?rosa the enumeration of particular cases to the 
idea of the nature common to them which will express itself 
in every individual; so that the truth reached applies not 
merely to the collection of individuals but has a general 
value. On the other hand, the value of the inductive con­
clusion d©p#nc!s on a sufficient enumeration of cases and thus, 
considered as an argimenT^r^roioFT^annotTordln^Tly at
least^ lead to complete certainty .........................
ihus, while the inductive process gives us definitely 
more than knowledge of a mere collectivity and really tells 
us something about the nature of a thing, it does not enable 
us to attain absolute certainty. We cannot always be sure 
that the constancy of properties we observe in tho material 
which we can examine is an essential feature, and this is 
because the inductive process "does not really lay the nature 
of things open to us, or enable us to discern their inherent 
necessities*.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
45
enormous, but absolute certainty is never reached.
The facts obtained through observation and experi­
mentation, although of fundamental import, do not constitute 
a science until they have been classified and correlated through 
scientific induction. The function of a scientist rests up >n 
the interpretation of results in order to discover a law.
Within the natural sciences a law is sometimes defined as,
"A common mode of action of material things”.9 The laws 
which are formulated have as their test the capability of 
experimental verification within the limits of calculated 
error. If a law Is verified within the limits of experi­
mental error, it is an exact law; and if the -deviation is 
somewhat greater than that inherent in the experiment, it is 
an approximate law.
The element of probability which is a characteristic 
of scientific induction also manifests Itself in the scien­
tific law. Scientific laws are such are not statements of 
absolute certitude, nor are they totally contigent. The 
reason for the element of stability in a scientific law is, 
as M. M&ritain has indicated, the fact that it does nothing 
but explain or express in a more or less direct,or more or 
less distorted manner the properties or exigencies of a 
certain ontological indivisible. This ontological indivisi­
ble which is not within the observable remains an x an
9 Richardson and Scarlett, op. cit.. p. 10.
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indispensable x for the natural sciences. This x is none
other than what philosophy designates by the same essence.
10or n a t u r e . Although scientific laws seek to express the 
essences and natures of things, it must be clearly under­
stood, as M. Maritain has pointed out, that the natural 
sciences do not penetrate to these essences in their in­
telligible constitution. Even the question of knowing 
whether the provisional and unstable categories which the 
scientists construct, and upon which they toil, correspond 
exactly to these essences, reamins in doubt, nevertheless, 
the raison d*etre for the necessity of the stable relations 
among the elements chosen by the scientists from phenomena, 
formulated by the scientists, and upon which they build, 
resides exactly in these presupposed ontological non-obser- 
vables. The necessity of these laws is founded on the fact 
that they are concerned with the observable manifestations 
of the essences or natures, and that these.essences or natures 
are the foundation of intelligible necessities^.
10 /Maritain, Les hearss Du Savoir. p. 50. BReraar-
quons que la loi scientique ne fait jamais q«*exprimer (de 
faco,n jplus on groins direct© ou plus raoins detournee) la pro- 
priete .ou 1*exigence d*un certain indivisible ontologique 
qui par lui-a^ke ne tomb© sous les sens {nfest pas observable) 
et rest© pour les science de la nature un x (d’ailleurs in­
dispensable), et qui n*est autre qu© ce que les philosophes 
designent sous le non de nature our essence.”
^  Ibid*, p. 51* wLes sciences experimentales ne 
penetrant pas ces essences dans leur constitution intelli­
gible et morse la question de savoir si les categories plus 
ou moins provisiores et instables qu*ellas construisent et
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A scientific law is a statement of the relation­
ship discovered among certain phenomena through observation 
and experimentation. As a law it can reach a hlgn degree 
of probability but never absolute certitude, since it is 
based on incomplete induction. The possibility always exists 
that the investigator may discover an exception which would 
require a modification of the law. This poses one of the 
major limits of a scientific law, and the material sciences. 
The stability and power of a scientific law lies in the 
fact that it is concerned with the observable manifestations 
of essences of things. In this respect the necessity of a 
scientific law is founded on the fact that it seeks to ex­
press and describe, however poorly, the properties of the 
natures of things as they manifest themselves within the 
realm of the observable and measurable. Therefore, a scien­
tific law Is a composite of the necessary and the contingent, 
where the contingent must always be prepared to submit to 
modifications introduced by new discoveries gained through 
the dialectic of science. In the course of this dialectic, 
the necessary factors of an old law, if its basic premises
sur lesquelles elles operentlour travail rationnel leur 
correspondent exaetement, reate le plus souvent douteuse. 
G*est bien cependant dans ces non-observables ontologiernes 
oresupposes que reside la raison d'^^tre de’Tfa" neceasite des 
relations stable formulees par le science entre les elements 
que 1*esprit choisit dans les phenoneues, ou qu* il construit 
sur leur fondemont. La necessity des lois vient de ce que 
celles-ci coneerant proprement et en fin de compte les essen­
ces ou natures, et de ce que les essences ou natures sont le 
lieu des necessites intelligibles."
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are correct, always find a place in the new law which 
supersede© it*
The natural sciences are never content with the 
knowledge of facts and laws alone* They seek a further 
explanation which is a hypothesis, a definitely reasoned 
explanation of the facts and laws which have been accumu­
lated by scientific research* The characteristics of a 
scientific hypothesis are such, as Coffey has indicated, 
that it must be based on accurate and unbiased observation 
of facts; it must be constructed in order to explain them; 
and therefore, must have for its object a real cause. It 
must be self-consistent and must be free from conflict 
with established truths and laws since truth cannot oppose 
truth* In this instance, caution is needed to assure a 
real conflict which cannot be eliminated by any -possible 
restatement of a proposed, hypothesis* The hypothesis 
must be based on some analogy with known causes; be capable 
of exact deductive inference; and must be verifiable by 
the submission of these inferences to the control of ob­
servation and experimentation* Wien a hypothesis presents 
not only a sufficient explanation, but the only possible 
explanation of the facts it purports to account for, it is 
verified or established^.
Coffeyt os. cit*« II, 121,
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The conditions n cessary for the proper develop­
ment of a scientific hypothesis also apply to a scientific 
theory, inasmuch as a scientific theory is usually defined 
as Ma hypothesis which has been applied to an extensive 
series of related facts and has been found satisfactory in 
its explanation of those f a c t s  It is important to
the complete understanding of the nature of a scientific
theory to comprehend, as E.f. Caldin has indicated, that a
scientific theory, as a working hypothesis, is not a strict 
deduction, but a construction based on empirical laws.
A scientific theory is not deducible by 
. formal logic fro® the empirical laws that 
support It. The argument is not of the 
deductlbely correct type, *j» implies £*
(in other words, %2 deducible from p),
but jg 1* likely on the evidence, there­
fore, £ is likely - where £ stands for an 
empirical law or set of laws, and £ for 
a unifying theory. It is rather a sort 
of inverted for® of this argument: tt£
(a unifying theory) implies p.r.s: but
M , and s are empirical generalisations t are likely on the evidence; therefore,
§is likely. The conclusion does not ollow from the premise; the likelihood 
of the theory is therefore not a dedu­
ction fro® the empirical laws that are 
taken to support it. Mow then is a 
theory validT The answer is parallel 
to that which we give for empirical 
generalisation. Scientific theories
^  iiichardson and Scarlett, op. clt.. p. 11.
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are not deductions but interpretations 
(a® indeed %hey are eoauoniy called in 
science} ; these interpretations dales 
validity in as much as we are justified 
In regarding empirical laws as signs 
pointing to'the unified scheme or 
picture' presented by a theory, the 
justification of the belief that em­
pirical laws are signs of a more fund­
amental order requires at least the 
assumption that there is order in 
nature.1^
Therefore, a scientific theory, together with the other 
generalizations of the natural sciences, relies for its 
justification on the primary postulate that there is uni­
formity in nature.
Within the framework of the natural sciences it 
might appear that certain theories, such as the complex 
theories of physico-mathematics, are completely divorced 
from reality, however, this is not the case* As M. Marl- 
tain has carefully pointed out, physics is based on the 
ontologicclly real and is preoccupied with causes; but in 
the instance of physico-mathenatics, it only envisages these 
physical causes from the angle of mathematics. It retains 
the real only in its measurable bearing _as recorded by in­
struments; and it is through these measurements which are 
real, that the entities of this science have a foundation
3*4 l.F. Caldin, The Power and limits of Science. 
”A Philosophical Study** rKndonl:',ir’(ihapSan" and' "Hall "ltd.",' 
1949)» P- 69.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In reality; but it is in the measurable that mathematical 
physics resolves all its concepts, which alone have meaning 
for it. Once attained, these measurements are joined by 
mathematical relationships, deductive in for®, which need 
to be completed by a certain hypothetical construction of 
the physically real, wherein it is only asked that their 
ultimate numerical results should coincide with the measure­
ments of things gained by the instruments utilized^5. in 
this way mathematical theories co-ordinate the physical laws 
discovered by experimentation through the utilization of 
mathematics.
Just as in all science, mathematical physics and its 
theories seek the truth, but in the followihg sense. As M. 
Maritain has indicated, a physico-mathematical theory is 
considered "true" when the comprehensive and correlated 
system, and the arrangement of mathematical symbols and
^ Mar it a in, its Deeres Du Savoir. p.p.121-122. nLa 
physique 8*&pplui© sur la realitd' ontologique, ©lie ost pre- 
occupee des causes... Mals cette realit! ontologique, ces 
causes physiques, ©lie les^envisage exclusiveiaent sous 1* 
angle wathematique... Bu reel, ©lie n© retient que son com­
port ement mesurable, les mesures prises sur lui par nos in­
struments, - et ces mesures, c*est bien q elque chose de r6ifel 
c*est rSce av ©lies que les entites et les symbols de la 
physico-mathcEiatique sont fondls dans la rSalite. Mais c’est 
dans le mesurable qu’elle rlsout toua sea concepts, le 
mesurabl© ®eul a un sens pour @11®. Et une fois en posses­
sion de aes mesures, ©11© vis© essentiellement s' tisser entr© 
elles un reseau de relations ajathematiques a forme deductive* 
Qui sans doute, devron^, so completer par une certain® recon­
struction hy tothetique du riel physique, mais aux-quelles il 
est seuifeeraent demand! que leurs ultimes resultats nuaeriques 
avec las assures effectuees sur le choses par nos instruments
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explicative entities which it can organizet coincides in 
all its numerical conclusions with real measurements effected 
by an investigator. It is not in the least necessary that 
each of the symbols and the mathematical beingis in question 
should precisely correspond with any physical reality, a 
certain nature or ontological law in the world of bodies^.
With certain modifications, the requirements for a physico- 
matheaatical theory to be true, applies to all scientific 
theories.
Thus, a scientific theory is a definitely reasoned 
explanation of facts accumulated by investigation which has 
been applied to an extensive series of facts which are re­
lated and has been found satisfactory in its explanation of 
those facts. It is not deducible by formal logic fro® the 
empirical laws that underlie it; rather, it is an Interpre­
tation of the empirical laws which support it. A scientific 
theory is developed by a standard procedure and its validity 
is tested by experiments deduced from it. As a theory it 
can reach a high degree of pro ability but never absolute
^  Ibid., pp. 122-123. ”Une theorie phys ico-matheraat ique 
sera dlte wvraTe” quand le system© coherent et le plus ample 
possible de symbol©s aathematiques et d'entites explieatives 
qu'elle aura organise" coincidera par to;.tor. ses conclusions 
numeriques avec les assures reelement effectuees ar nous, 
sans qu*il soit nuilement necessaire qu’une realite" physique, 
un© certain© nature on lol pntologlque dans le mond© des 
corps, correspond dateraineraent as chacun des symbol©s et, des 
Stres matheraatiquas en question."
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certitude since it is founded on empirical laws which them­
selves are based on incomplete Induction. The possibility e 
exists that further research may discover an exception which 
would require modification of the theory. This poses one of 
the major limitations of a scientific theory and consequently 
scientific knowledge. The stability and power of scientific 
theory is founded on the fact that it seeks to express and 
describe, however poorly and remotely, the properties of the 
nature of things as they manifest themselves within the 
realm of the observable and the measurable. Therefore,a 
scientific theory is a composite of the necessary and the 
contingent, where the contingent must be prepared to be sub­
mitted to the dialectic of science. In the course of this 
dialectic, the necessary factors of the old theory, if its 
basic premises are correct, always find a place in the new 
theory which supersedes it.
In the terns of a brief illustration, the earlier 
stages of the atomic theory provide an excellent example of 
the type of knowledge discovered by the application of the 
scientific method to the problem of change within the realm 
of the observable and the measurable. 'As Dr. lonant has 
pointed-out, the idea that matter was composed of fundamental 
uni s, or ultimate particles goes back to the dawn of western 
thought. If expressed merely in general terms, the concept 
of fundamental units, as a speculative idea, can hardly be 
regarded as an integral part of the natural sciences until
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it forms the basis of a working hypothesis frow. which de­
ductions capable of experimental verification can oe made.
As a working hypothesis, the atomic theory became a new 
conceptual scheme only after Dalton had demonstrated how 
fruitful it was in connection with the quantitative chemical 
experimentation that had been developed, by the chemical re­
volution^.
In this instance, the rebirth of the atomic theory 
was ho accident because certain experiments by Lavoiser and 
others cast grave doubts on the current theory of that time, 
the phlogiston theory. Historically, George Ernest Stahl 
(1660-1734) was the chief advocate of the phlogiston theory. 
A theory which considered that all metals were made up of 
calces - our raet&l oxides - and phlogiston, a combustible 
material. In the process of the combustion of metals it was 
assumed that phlogiston was expelled and that the calx re­
mained. The smaller the residue of calx after combustion,
U  James B. Conant, Science and Common Sense (Hew 
York: Yale University Press,,r"I^ 3T)"»" p# 4$. notion that
there were fundamental units - ultimate particles - of which 
matter was composed goes back to ancient times. But expres­
sed merely in general terras this is a speculative idea and 
can hardly be considered an integral part of ‘die fabric of 
science until It becomes the basis of a working hypothesis 
on a grand scale .from which deductions capable of experimental 
test can be made. This particular speculative idea or work­
ing hypothesis on a grand scale, became a new conceptual 
scheme only after Dalton had shown about 1$0G how fruitful 
it was in connection with the quantitative chemical experi­
mentation that had been initiated by the chemical revolution.”
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the more phlogiston it contained. Consequently, in the
light of this theory, carbon was considered as consisting
entirely of phlogiston. If carbon was added to a metal
calx, the calx would absorb phlogiston and become a metal 
1#again . The object of this theory was the system!sation
of the phenomena of oxidation and reduction which is so 
important in chemistry.
The basic premise upon which the phlogiston theory 
was constructed was the postulate that metals lose weight 
through combustion. Therefore with the enunciation and 
the experimental verification of the law of constant compo­
sition which stated that every chemical compound contains 
unvarying proportions of its constituent.3 , and of the law 
of the conservation of mass which stated that in every 
chemical change the total mass of the reactants is exactly 
equal to the total mass of the products, the weakness of 
the phlogiston theory became apparent. More specifically, 
it was discovered that a metal gains weight in combustion 
and, therefore, the phlogiston theory was discarded because 
its basic premise had been dlsnroven.
Subsequent to these developments, and after con­
siderable experimental research, John Dalton developed the
Andrew 0. Van Meiaen, From Atoaos to Atoms. ’’The 
History of the Concept Atom1*, transT he' -ry T.'r Korn ''IP'itts- 
burgs Duquesne University Press, 1952), p. 132.
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law of nultlple proportions* This law stated that when
any two elements A and B combine to fora more than on©
compound, the weights of A that will combine with 1 g. of
B are in the ratio of small whole numbers. For Dalton this
justified a notion which he h-;.s always considered, and
allowed him to elaborate his atomic theory. The basic
premises of his thought becomes evident from these sections
of his atomic theory.
There are three distinctions in the kinds 
of bodies, or three states which have more 
especially claimed the attention of philo­
sophical chemists, namely, those which are 
marked by the terms elastic fluids, liquids, 
and solids* A very fSSi'Xiar" instance is 
exhiSIte<r*‘to us in water, of a. body, which, 
in certain circumstances is capable of 
assuming all three states. In steam we 
recognise a perfectly elastic fluid, in 
water, a perfect liquid, and in ice a 
perfect solid* These observations have 
tabitly led to the conclusion which seems 
universally adopted, that all bodies of 
sensible magnitude, whether liquid or 
solid, are constituted of a tpst number of 
extremely small particles or atoms of 
matter bound together by a force of 
attraction which is more or less power­
ful, according to the circumstances, and 
which as it endeavours to prevent their 
separation is very properly called in that 
view, attraction of cohesion; but as it 
Golleoii’TliST”^^^  state (as
fro® steam into water) it is called attra­
ction^ of aggregation or more simply affi- 
i t*y * ^
2-9 John Dalton, A hew System of Chemical Philosophy 
(London; 1&42), p. 141*
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, Dalton’s outstanding achievement was the interpre­
tation of the new chemical data and the new chemical laws 
through his atonic theory. He gave new impetus to the idea 
that change must be explained by means of small particles. 
His atoms did not have vague specifications but were endowed 
with those properties which the progress of chemistry de­
manded. In the light of this theory, the experimental 
sciences have progressed to determine other specific pro­
perties of the atom which has enabled them to enlarge upon 
and modify Dalton’s atomic'theory.
This brief outline of the development of Dalton1a
atomic theory serves to illustrate that the progress of the
!
experimental sciences is bound up in a strict adherence to 
their principles. The first is the empirical principle 
which refers to the method of experimental sciences, it 
requires a strict adherence to the accepted methods and re­
quires their proper application. The phlogiston theory 
serves as real example of the consequences when the basic 
premises which underlie & theory are faulty. This principle 
also serves to limit scientific knowledge to the type gained 
through observation and experimentation; but in defining 
scientific knowledge as that gained arid verified by the ex­
perimental method, it forms no conclusions about other 
methods employed by other intellectual disciplines.
The second basis for scientific knowledge is the 
quantitative principle which necessarily follows, from the
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first. The quantitative principle is a limiting principle 
which states that as long as science is true to its method,
It must confine its studies to the observable and measur­
able aspects of reality, and, therefore, the knowledge 
gained is restricted to the observable and measurable 
within the real® of reality. The atomic theory, for ex­
ample, illustrate® that the scientific method begins and 
end© with the observable and measurable, the knowledge 
gained, therefore, ia otily concerned with the observable 
and measurable of reality. Again the quantitative principle 
does not speculate about the possibility of other aspects 
of reality which might bo known in different ways since 
they fall outside the scope of scientific investigation.
The third principle, the mechanical urine 1 ole.. is 
concerned with the goal of every scientific inquiry, Science 
alas at gaining, a knowledge of the general laws that govern 
the behaviour of events within the observable and measur­
able of reality. It is necessary to the stability of scien­
tific knowledge that the laws which It enunciates happen 
in regular, repeated and invariable sequences. The atomic 
theory, in this instance, would be of no consequence were 
it not based on laws which reflected the uniformity of 
nature and causality. Therefore, the mechanical principle 
Is a Hatting principle which recognises that scientific 
knowledge, because it is concerned with laws, is
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restricted to the assimilation of that kind of behaviour 
which, consists of natural cause artel effect series. Again, 
just as its counterparts, the mechanical principle only 
acts within the lines of strict scientific investigation 
and does not reflect on any other acts such as chance which 
occur outside its sphere of application.
The fourth fundamental principle of science is the 
progressive principle, which deals with the natural dialectic 
of the experimental sciences. This principle affirms that 
scientific knowledge is constantly being revised, Avery 
scientific theory is liable to constant Modifications and 
revisions in the light of future experience. If any part 
of scientific knowledge is in error, it is rejected just 
as the phlogiston theory was rejected when it was found in 
error. Moreover, the knowledge of science is not only always 
expanding, but is normally available to all Investigators 
so that every scientist stands on the shoulder of his pre­
decessor. Again, this progressive principle contains no im­
plications about progress on other levels of life; and in 
itself is no guarantee of human progress^.
These four principles present the characteristics 
and limitations of the natural sciences, and of scientific
The development of these four principles of the 
natural sciences is patterned after a similar development in 
B.R.G. Owens, Scientism. Man and Religion {Philadelphia: The 
Westminister Press, "1952)","'p p 20• ;
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knowledge. Experimentation and the other steps of this 
procedure form the basic pattern for every scientific ad­
vance. this pattern is a constant in every scientific in­
vestigation, new or old; in one respect it forms the history 
of scientific knowledge because the unfolding of this method 
coupled with the ingenuity, the intuition, and the fallibi­
lity of tha scientist marks the progress of the experimental 
sciences. The whole of scientific knowledge is constructed 
through its theories and laws upon the experimental, and so 
it also suffers from the Incomplete enumeration of scientific 
induction. Therefore, scientific knowledge may reach a high 
degree of probability but never absolute certitude. The 
possibility always exists that new discoveries will require 
modifications within its structure. This poses one of the 
major limitations of scientific knowledge, and distinguishes 
it from the knowledge gained by other intellectual disciplines. 
The stability and power of scientific knowledge is founded 
on the fact that it seeks to express the properties of the 
natures of t hings as they manifest themselves within the 
realm of the observable and measurable of reality. Scien­
tific knowledge is a composite of the necessary and the con­
tingent where the contingent must always be prepared to be 
submitted to the natural dialectic of the sciences. In the 
course of this dialectic, the necessary factors of scientific 
knowledge, if their basic premises are correct, always find 
a place in the new knowledge which modifies or supersedes it.
A S S U P T P 1 I V T O Y
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IV
ON THE NATURE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
Philosophy, since it is a study of reality, has in 
the course of the development of Western thought, sought 
the solution of many of the problems of sensible nature 
which have confronted it. Accordingly, the study of the 
problems of ens mobile has been prominent both in philo­
sophy and in the sciences of phenomena. It is a fact of 
historical record that the many problems, which arose from 
the investigation of sensible reality, presented such a 
provoking challenge to thoughtful men, that the whole effort 
of the early Greek philosophers, such as Thales, heracleitus, 
and Anaxagoras, was directed toward their solution. The 
Investigations of these philosophers, their contemporaries, 
and their successors culminated in the major contributions 
of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.
With the decline of philosophical progress, and the 
discovery and immediate success of the experimental method, 
a new era was born. Philosophy, forgetful of its great 
heritage, also sought to continue its progress by adopting 
both hhe new experimental method, and the conclusions which 
the experimental sciences had discovered and formulated.
The experimental method became for many the philosophical 
instrument for research and the scientific theories, its 
basic premises. Therefore, as a consequence, it would seem
61
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that these philosophical systems which have scientific 
theories as their basic premises would face annihilation 
as complete systems as soon as the theories upon which they 
stand are superseded in the natural dialectic of scientific 
progress* In contrast to these systems, Thomism does hot 
pretend to imitate the experimental method or to adopt any 
particular scientific theory as its foundatiort. In direct 
reference to the question of ens mobile, it cannot be over­
emphasized that the principles and conclusions expressed 
by thomism, through its philosophy of nature, are not the 
products of scientific experimentation.
Instead, thomism tries to reach beyond phenomena, 
in order to grasp what the mind perceives to be most inward 
and fundamental in things* As Britain has pointed out, 
the inmost core of things which philosophy seeks to discover 
is being, the being in sensible things which is first 
object attained by the intellect. And what is being?
Being is what exists or can exist; it first and immediately 
presents to the intellect that it exists, or can exist out­
side the mind* It is sufficient to experience the absolute 
impossibility of the Intellect’s thinking of the principle
of identity; what is, is, without positing (at least possible) 
extramental being, of which the principle of identity is
the first of all axioms. Ihis apprehension of being is ab­
solutely primary and is implied in all other intellectual
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apprehensions*-.
6ince philosophy has its foundation in being, 
rather than in the observable and measurable aspects of 
sensible phenomena, it is essentially distinct from the 
natural sciences. This difference is also reflected in the 
methods peculiar to each intellectual discipline. Just as 
the scientific method is directed to the discovery of the 
relationships among phenomena, so the philosophical approach 
is geared to the discovery and development of the laws and 
principles of being. The point of initiation for the 
philosophical method is being, as found in extramenta! 
reality. It is the real made known by the senses, and 
attained by physical contact with the universe. Philo­
sophy rests upon facts which are well founded existential 
truths. These facts are not created by the human mind, but 
are given to the mind which discerns and judges them. Philo­
sophy in its search for truth begins with experience.
Although philosophy begins with experience, it does
Maritain, Les Degree Du Savoir, pp. 1#3~1$4. WL’« 
etre, en effet (1 * etre eriveYoppd1 dans les choses sensibles) 
efct le premier object atteint par notre intelligence, Et 
qu’est-ce qui est signifi^ par ce no® d’etre sinon ce qui 
existe ou peut exister; et qu’est-c© qui est d*abord et imrae- 
iliatement presente' 'par la a 1*intelligence sinon ce qui existe 
o? peut exister pour s*4... II suffit a chaucun de se con­
sul ter soi meme et d*experimenter en sol l’impossibilite 
absolue ou^  se trouve 1*intelligence de penser le principe 
d’ldentite’ sans poser de l’etre extramental (au moins pos­
sible) dont ce premier de tous les axioms exprime le com- 
portement. •* Cette apprehension de l’etre est absolument 
premiere et elle est impliquee dans toue nos autres appre­
hensions intellectuelles.”
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not at® at a knowledge of the particular, but seeks to 
discover the necessary and universal principles witch are 
contained in the inner core of reality. Therefor®, the 
first major part of the philosophical method is the move­
ment from the plan© of the particular to the plan© of the 
universal, and the formation of universal concepts. In 
hia description of this initial step, Coffey has in­
dicated that it is from sense observations of a few in­
stances that these concepts are formed, These observations 
are n@cessa.ry in order to get, for example, the notions of 
"whole* and "part*' and 11 greater”. Once these intellectual 
notions have been abstracted from sense experience and have 
been compared with one another, there is an immediate in­
tellectual intuition of the necessary truth that "the whole 
is greater than its parts. It will be seen that this truth 
does apply to every whole, be it actual or possible, known 
or unknown, This truth is assented to, not because all tho 
instances have been -examined, but because the relation is 
perceived to universal because it is necessary. This pro­
cess of abstraction, intuition, and generalisation, by 
which a knowledge of self-evident necessary principles is
attained through the notions which are abstracted from 
sense experience, is sometimes called induction. Here the
term, is used in its widest sens© to denote every mental
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process by which there it# an ascension from or through 
the particular to the universal2*
Thus, once the iiiteUo t grasps tee notion of 
being, it perceives certain fandammUtL pr trie in,lea through 
abstraction, intuition, mid general!author, these prin­
ciples are the principle of identity which stater; what 
Is, is; and the principle of non-co n t rad it ion which states; 
what is, cannot not be at the same tiisse and in the stisse re­
lation# There necessary and universal principles are the 
point of initiation for the next aajor part of the philo­
sophical method which is the syllogism*
The syllogism is distinguished froa other types 
©£ argumentation according to the manner in which it mani­
fests the truth. M* narlt&in has indicated that in a 
syllogism the taind begins with the- first universal prin­
ciples known tm-.edlately by the intelligence and joins these 
principles to & conclusion, or conversely, the mind can 
resolve a conclusioa Into these principles, here the mind
®ove® Purcly OB **» infculligibli' plane, and develops the 
truth of the propositions, in so far-as It Is contained
2 0©ffey, fi&aJ&fc** 11 * 2^*
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in the universal truth from which it has been drawn. In 
the terms of M. Maritain1s example, the preceding is illus­
trated! "Everything that subsists immaterially is indes­
tructible, but tho human soul subsists immaterially; there­
fore the human soul is indestructible."
This is an example of a deductive argument or 
syllogism in which the S (human soul) and the Pr (indes­
tructible) of tho conclusion are united to each other by 
their common union to the middle term (that subsists imma­
terially) .3
More specifically, M. Maritain has defined a syllo­
gism as, "an argumentation in which, from an antecedent that 
unites two terms to a third, a consequent is inferred uniting
3 Maritain, "L’Ordre Das Concepts", Clements De 
Philosophic. II, 196. "hotre aspir.it se raeut a partir des 
premiers' arinciues universal^ connua iranediatcment par 
1* intelligence. on reliant a ces principea une conclusion 
ou en la * resolvantf en eux: il se r.teut alors purement sur 
le plan intelligible, et il manifesto la verite d ’une pro­
position en tani qu’elle est continue dans une verite uni- 
verselle dont ell© derive.
Example: Tout ce qui subsist© imrrtateriallement est indest­
ructible; or l’ame hunaine subsist© immateriellement done
I1 am® humaine est indestructible.
C,est 1*argumentation deductive ou le syllogism© 
dans lequel le''"!'"! 1 * am©" humaine) ' et' "le" Pr (indestructible) 
de la Conclusion sont unis entre eux de par leur union a 
troisieme term© appele raoyen terse ("qui subsist© immater- 
ielleraent”).
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these two terras to each o t h e r . T h e  two terms, as M. 
Maritain has indicated, that are united as 3 and Br in the 
conclusion are called extremes. Since the Pr normally has 
a greater extension than the 3, the Fr of the conclusion is 
called the Major Extreme or the Major Term (T), aad the 3 
of the conclusion, the Minor Extreme or the Minor Term (t)• 
The term to which etch of these two terms T and t is united 
in the antecedent, and which is the means or reason of their 
union in the conclusion, is called the Middle Tern (M)•
These three terms, T, t, and M, are remote matter of the 
syllogism* The two propositions composing the antecedent, 
each of which unites one of the extremes to the Middle Term, 
are called the Premises of the syllogism. The premise con­
taining the Major Term {the term that becomes the- Pr of the 
conclusion) is called the Major. The premise containing the 
Minor term (the ter® that becomes the S of the conclusion) 
is called the Minor. The Major, Minor, and Conclusion con­
stitute the proximate matter of the syllogism?.
^ Ibid., p. 207* ”1?n® argumentation dans laauelle
d fun antecedent oul unit deux' tarawa a un trois&ae. au in- 
fere un consequent aui unit ces deug tomes entr® eux.”
 ^Ibid.. p. 20$. M0n appelle qxtrcki&s les deux termas 
qui sont unis a titre de 3 et d® i*r clans la Conclusion. St 
comas® 1® Pr a noraalement une extension plus grande que le 3, 
on est convenu df appeler fke Pr de la Conclusion Grande Extr^ae 
ou Grand® Term® (?) et d*appeler le 3 de la Conclusion Petit 
SxfFrem® ou Petit Term® (t). Le Terffie^auquel chacun do. ces 
deux teraes T et est uni dans 1*antecedent, et qui est aovan 
oumison da leur union dans la Conclusion est appele Moyen 
Term® (M). Ces trois terraes T, t et M, sont la saatiefr® eldr 
gnee du Syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ..........  .\.
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The syllogism, as a mode of reasoning, not only has 
its point of initiation with the principles of identity and 
non-contradiction, but also depends on these same principles 
for its strength and validity. For as M, Maritain has pointed 
out, the total force of the syllogism and the deductive art 
hinges upon this supreme self-evident principle which is: 
two things, identical with the same third thing are iden­
tical with each other; or, two things, one of which is iden­
tical, the other not identical with a same third thing, are 
different from each other. This principle, as the principle 
of triple identity in its positive form, and the principle 
of the separating third in its negative form, is but a par­
ticular expression of the principle of identity, or of the 
principle of contradiction. But the first principle of 
syllogism may be applied to those reasonings which have for 
their matter abstract and universal concepts only through 
two other equally basic principles, which deal with the 
relation of the universal concept with its subjective parts. 
Accordingly, this principle states: that which is universally 
affirmed of a subject, is affirmed of everything contained 
under that subject; or that which is universally denied of
lies deux Propositions^qui composent 1*antecedent, et doht 
chacune unit l*un des extremes au i^oyen Teiane sont appelies 
les Premisses du Syllogisms. Celle qui contiont le Grande 
Terme * c'est-a-dire le term© qui sera le Pr de la Conclusion)! 
est appele Majeure. Celle qui contient le Petit Terme {c*est 
a dire la term® qui sera le S de la Conclusion) est appele 
Mineure. Majeurfc, Mineure et Conclusion constitutent le 
matter© prochains de Syllogism.”
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a subject, is denied of everything contained under that 
subject. These principles are self-evident since it is the 
nature of the universal to be one and the same in all those
as a process of reasoning, is governed by certain definite 
limits which, if adhered to, allow the development and dis­
covery of certain universal truths, Thses truths are derived 
from necessary principles gained from experience through ab­
straction, intuition, and generalization, and are as certain 
as the principles upon which they rest. Herein lies one of 
the major reasons for the power and range of philosophy.
et de 1*.. .. . - ...____ ________  __ ______  ,;._r
lui-meme:
Deux chose identiques a une meiae troisieme sont identifues
eotre" elTes;....... . """ " ......"""""" " "" 1" ■
et deux choses dont l*une eat identique
et I 1 autre non identique a* une metne troisieme sont diverses 
eritre" eTles*
&e" principe qu’on pourrait appeler wprincipe de la triple iden- 
titl” dans sa forme positive, et "principe du tiers separ^nt” 
dans sa forme negative, n*est qu*une expression particuliere 
du principe d’identite, ... ou de contradiction . . . . . . .
Mais le principe du Syllogism® ne peut s’appliquer it nos raison- 
r.emenbs - qui ont pour matiere des concepts, abstraits et uni- 
versels, - que mpyennant deux autres orincioes egalement supremes, 
qui concernent la rapport du concept universal, avec ses parties 
subjective® et qu’on ne saurait meconnattre sans d&truire le 
Syllogism®. ^
Tout ce qui est a ffirme d*un sujet untversellement est
affirm^ de tout c V  qu'f' 'est' coirt'emT'sro^  ^ ces
qui" e st' "uni' ver selXement 1t&3T <31 '* un sujet ."est" ni«T' aus si d e tout
ce"" qui est eintenu sous' 'ce sujet. . . Ges de^'pHhcipes sont 
connus de soi ou"'evidents” par Vux-mSmes, puisque la nature de 
l*universel consist© precismnent ©n ce qu’il se trouve un et 
le mem© en toutes les choses & l’egard desquelles il est uni­
verse!. w
things in respect of which it is universal^. The syllogism,
Ibid.. pp. 215-217. "Toute la vertu du Syllogisms
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Within the structure of philosophy, there are cer­
tain definite divisions which lend order to this science, 
and exercise certain limitations on each of its parts.
This division is the three degrees of abstraction, which 
correspond to the degree of immateriality of the object 
under study, and permit the classification of the generic 
types of knowledge. Within the first degree, which is the 
recognized field of research for physics and the philosophy 
of nature, the mind abstracts from singular and individual 
matter only. The object which the mind presents to itself 
can neither exist, nor be coneeived apart from or without 
sensible matter. The object studied is ens mobile, being 
as subject to change. Within the second degree, which is 
the field of mathematics, the mind abstracts from sensible 
matter, and the object considered is quantity, which cannot 
exist apart from matter, but can be conceived apart from it. 
Finally, within the third degree of abstraction, which is 
the field of metaphysics, the mind abstracts from all matter, 
and the object grasped is being as being, which cannot only 
exist without matter, but can also be conceived without it7.
In each instance, the means for philosophical research is 
governed by the range and limitations of the particular
7 This brief outline of the three degrees of abstraction 
is a summary of a more complete exegesis found in maritain, la 
Philosophic 0© La Mature, pp.. 12-14. \
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degree of abstraction within which it is employed, and 
results, in each case, in a type of knowledge with certain 
definite characteristics.
The degree of abstraction determines the character­
istics of the type of knowledge gained from ens mobile.
For as Maritain has indicated, the philosophy of nature 
resolves its concepts from intelligible being. This know­
ledge is the product of a type of ontological explication 
open to the speculative intellect. It is not connected 
wit|i empiric conditions, but with reasons of being and 
primary causes; and tries to discover the nature of things.
The philosophy of nature relies on experience much more 
closely than does metaphysics, and must be prepared and able 
to submit its judgments to the verification of the senses; 
but it is a deductive apprehension which assigns reasons 
and intelligible necessities in the degree to which it is 
assured of the intrinsic constituents or the essence of its 
object y The philosophy of nature is able to gain a knowledge
£ /
Maritain, Les Deeres Du Savoir. p. 345» ”0*681 dans
l*etre intelligible lui-meme, si obombre qu*il soit par la 
matidre sensible, qu * un tel savoir resout ses concepts, ils 
ressortit a un type d*explication ontologique ouvert au mouve- 
ment natural de 1*intelligence speculative. Ce n*est pas aux 
conditions erapiriques, e’eat aux raisons d’etre et aux causes
propremerit dites qu*il s*attache; e’est les essence des choses 
qu’illveur decotivrir ... II depend de 1*experience d’une fapon 
plus contraignante que la mataphysique et doit pouvoir amener 
ses jugements jusqu* a'la verification du sens, raais c*est un 
savoir deduct if*, assignent les raisons et les ne'cessites in*? 
telligibles dans la mesure ou il s* est assure du constitutif 
intrinsdque ou de la quiddite de ses objets.” '
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of the Intelligible aspect© of sensible reality which is 
specifically distinct fro® the knowledge gained by the 
natural sciences* The scientist seeks to investigate ena 
mobile from the point of view of its observational and 
measurable characteristics, and he arrives at descriptive 
knowledge such as the atomic theory. The philosopher seeks 
to investigate ens mobile, from the point of view of its in­
telligible aspects and arrives fet essential knowledge such 
as the hyloraorphlc theory.
When a philosopher begins a study of the problem of 
change, in corporeal beings, he is confronted with certain 
difficulties. The first is the problem of the primary con­
stitutive principles of ens mobile, a problem arising chiefly 
from the difficulty of reconciling being as stable and 
determinate, with being as dynamic and indeterminate. From 
observation, it can be seen that corporeal beings have inertia 
and activity, extension and indivisibility; and permanence 
and flux. The question then arises as to what the intrinsic 
causes are, that can account for these opposite properties 
in ens mobile. The philosophical atomists state that cor­
poreal beings are essentially inert, and they chose to ignore 
the intrinsic activity of corporeal beings. The philosophical 
dynamists on the other hand, choose to ignore the inherent 
passivity of mobile beings, and state that corporeal eings 
are essentially active. The integral position of the Aristo­
telian- Thoraist explanation recognizes that corporeal beings
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are both active and passive.
Accordingly, as M. A'*arituin has enumerated, Aris­
totelian philosophy recognises two substantial principles 
in corporeal substances. The one is prime matter of which 
things arc made, which in itself is nothing actual; it is 
a principle wholly indeterminate, incapable of separate 
existence, but capable of existing in conjunction with some­
thing else, which is the form* The form is an active nrin- 
ciple of corporeal substance which determines the purely 
passive first matter^* This doctrine which regards a body 
as a compound of prime matter and substantial form is known 
as hylomorphisHi*
Furthermore, the hylomorphic theory states that a 
corporeal substance compounded of prime matter and substantial 
form is a real substantial unity endowed with active and 
passive powers, through which, by a tendency which is in­
herent, it seeks to develop its own perfection. It explains 
the opposite characteristics of ens mobile by two principles
9 Maritain, "Introduction General® A La Philosophie", 
Elements De Philosophic. I - 117* wLa philosophic d*Aris­
totle 'reconna&t dans 'la substance corporelle deux principles 
substantiels: % v
(1) la matiere (matieVe premiere). ••ini pur "avec quo!” les 
choses sont faites et qui par soi-nuhne n fest rien de fait, un 
principe absolument Indetermine, incapable d*exister par lui- 
meme, mais capable d*existor par autre chose (par "la forme"). 
{2) un principe actif, qui ©st comm l*idee viaante de la 
chose, ou comas© son am® et qui determinant cette raatiere 
premie're purement passive."
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which are incomplete and cannot exist separately* It takes 
into account both the dynamic and static properties of ens 
mobile, and provides the means for the development of a 
philosophical solution for many of the problems of sensible 
reality. Such a problem is substantial change,
Before this problem can be resolved into the primary 
terms of hylomorphism, it is first necessary to distinguish 
the various kinds of change. Change is divided into four 
species; substantial change or mutation which is the transi­
tion from one being to another; qualitative change which is 
alteration; change in quantity which is either augmentation 
or diminution; and change in place which is latio or local 
motion. Substantial change or autatio is divided into 
generatio and corruptio; "generatio est autatio de son sub- 
jecto in subjactum;" and, "corruptio est mutatio de subjecto 
in non subjectum."-*-® It is the *coming-into-being* of what 
did not exist, and the reverse passage in non-being. There­
fore, substantial change is the transition of one being 
Into another.
Through the development and application of the 
primary principles of corporeal substance, which are prime 
matter and substantial form, and the accidental principle of 
mutation which is privation, the philosopher is able to give
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Diaputatae De Veritate. 
Q. 2d, lc (Taurini ft&lia!
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an explanation for substantial change. Prime matter and 
substantial form are real and necessary principles of being 
in change, not ideal suppositions or mental constructs.
The first requirement for substantial change is a
subject. The common subject is prime matter which is pure
potency. As St, Thomas has staged, Momne quod generatur,
generatur ex aliquo, ut intellegltur id ex quo est gen®ratio
nnon privatio sed materia. Prime matter is the common foun­
dation that remains throughout the change,, Substantial 
change is transmutation rather than creation and total anni­
hilation.
The next requirement for substantial change is the 
term of generation which is the substantial form. It is 
the principle of determination and the first act of prime 
matter, Just as in the case of prime matter, when mutation 
occurs the substantial form does not suffer from generation 
or corruption. For, as St. Thomas has said, "foraae enim 
proprie non flunt, sed edueuntur de potentia materiae”.^2 
Thus, In substantial change, when a form Is acquired, it 
is educed from the potency of the matter, and when a form 
is lost, it reverts to the potency of the matter to reappear 
anew whenever external conditions conspire to cause its
^  Aquinas, In VII Metaphys. lect. 1 (Cathala no. 761).
12 Ibid.. lect. 7, (Cathala no. 1423).
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reappearance*
Substantial change, presupposes in the subject which
passes to a new substantial act a capacity to this rather
than to another form, and also supposes in the subject a
lack of such suitable form* The principle which signifies
this lack is privation, which is an accidental principle
of substantial change. As St. Thomas has said, "materia
enira sub una forma existens habet in se privationem alterius 
13formae", where "private non significat aliquam naturam in 
subject© sed oraesupposit subjectum cum aptitudine."lk Pri­
vation indicates that prime matter is disposed to certain 
perfections when the perfection is acquired privation dis­
appears. It is not the pure negation of fora but the negation 
of substantial fora in a suitable subject and so is a real 
principle. When generation is completed, privation ceases.
Therefore, every substantial change in the universe 
of mobile being requires something that remains through the 
change. This is prime matter. Otherwise there would be a 
constant annihilation and creation. It requires something 
new, substantially new, to which it tends while the old 
form disappears, or it would not b® substantial change.
It also requires the privation of a new fora in a suitable
13 Aquinas, In 111 Metaphys, lect. 4 (Cathala no. 2470}. 
Ik Aquinas, In X Metaphva.iect. 6 (Cathala no. 2051).
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subject, otherwise there would not be sufficient reason 
for the appearance of a new form. The corruption of one 
form is the generation of another, and conversely the 
generation of one form is the corruption of another.
The preceding examination of substantial change 
servos to illustrate that the operational technique of philo­
sophy, or in this instance the philosophy of nature, provides 
the means for the discovery of a real knowledge of the in­
telligible aspects of sensible reality. The philosopher be­
gins his study with the facts of ordinary experience. Once 
he has grasped being, and apprehended certain necessary 
principles, he is able to expand his investigation through 
deductive argumentation. Then, if the laws of logic have 
been adhered to rigorously, the truths which he has dis­
covered are as certain as the necessary and universal prin­
ciples from which they have been derived, so that, as in 
the case of the hylomorohic theory, he arrives at a certain 
knowledge of things in their causes. Herein lies the power 
of philosophy.
The philosophy of nature cannot penetrate the diver­
sities and specific particularities of the world of bodies. 
Within the first degree of abstraction, which is the legi­
timate orbit of the philosophy of nature, the essences of 
sensible things are hidden, and corporeal substances are 
rendered opaque, because of the element of resistance to 
intelligibility which belongs to matter. It is indeed
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possible to reach certain essential and specific determi­
nations concerning man, but below man, the essences remain 
hidden as to their specific natures. True philosophical 
certitudes are reached only in the distinction between 
very widely extended spheres such as matter and form, or 
living and non-living beings.
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CONCLUSIOU
Our study has revealed a clear-cut division be­
tween those who recognize a distinction between the philo­
sophy of nature and the natural sciences, and those who do 
not. The one group, made up of the pragmatists, the natural­
ists, the dialectal materialists and their adherents, fail 
to recognize the unique nature of traditional philosophy, 
and reject it as an invalid product of an obsolete method. 
They maintain that real knowledge is achieved by the experi­
mental method alone. Within this group the need for philo­
sophical speculation is resolved through the construction 
of systems which have their foundations resting upon the 
most recent accepted scientific doctrines. The other group, 
made up of isaritain, Caldln, Owen, Thompson, and others, 
who follow in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, 
recognizes the value and purpose of traditional philosophy, 
the value and accomplishments of the experimental sciences, 
and the Incomplete picture of reality offered by either 
science or philosophy when alone. They seek to unify the 
picture of reality and to restore order to the field of 
knowledge.
One of the fundamental tenets to which the various 
materialistic positions are anchored, is the premise that 
it is iraposiible to probe reality to the point where the
79
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nature of things can be laid open to the mind. Real know­
ledge is limited to phenomena and to the methods of the natural 
sciences. This limited concept of knowledge provides the 
major argument of this group against traditional philosophy.
In contrast to this position, the advocates of Thomisra main­
tain that it is Indeed possible to gain a knowledge of 
reality by a means quite distinct from the experimental 
method. The crux of the Thomistic position is that there 
are two distinct and valid approaches to sensible reality, 
namely the approach of the philosophy of nature, and that 
of the natural sciences.
For Thomists, the philosophy of nature has its point 
of initiation in the terms of observable data, but the mind 
in its consideration of these, seeks for their inward nature 
and intelligible reasons; it seeks to know what things are 
in themselves. The natural sciences, on the other hand, 
never seek the ontological for itself, and so, the resolution 
of concepts is made in an infra-philosophic direction.
What things are in themselves is not the point of interest; 
what is important are the possibilities of empiric proof 
and mensuration and the connecting together of the empirical 
data according to certain stable laws. Though the material 
object of the philosophy of nature and the natural sciences 
is the same, namely ens mobile, the formal object which 
determines the specific nature of these Intellectual dis­
ciplines is different. The scientist studies the laws of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
&1
phenomena, linking one observed instance to another, and 
if he seeks the structure of matter, it is by representing 
it to himself in terms of molecules, ions, and other similar 
constructs, within a framework of time and space, The 
philosopher, on the other hand, seeks for what in fact 
matter is, what the nature of corporeal substance is as a 
function of intelligible being.
In his search for knowledge, the scientist moves 
from the gisible to the visible, from the observable to the 
observable. The philosopher proceeds from the visible to 
the invisible; to what in itself is outside the bounds of 
all sensory observation. The principles which are the aim 
of the philosopher are pure objects of intellection, not of 
sensible apprehension, or imaginative representation. There­
fore, there are two distinct valid approaches to the study 
of sensible nature. The one, the philosophy of nature, 
studies sensible reality in an effort to seek out its in­
telligible aspects, that is, it emphasises the ens of ens 
mobile. The other, the natural sciences, approach reality 
in an effort to discover and correlate its observable and 
measurable aspects, that is, it emphasises the mobile of ens 
mobile.
Although the materialists deny the validity of the 
philosophy of nature just as firmly as the Thomists affirm 
it, there is no open dispute between these groups when it 
is a question of the technique of the natural sciences.
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When the focal point of the problem shifts from the purely 
technical aspects of the experimental sciences to the 
nature and limitations of scientific knowledge, the con­
flict arises again. On the one side, the major materialists 
are convinced that the experimental procedure provides the 
only means for analysing all the problems which confront 
humanity} and that the knowledge gained in this manner, 
alone is accepted as valid and true. On the other side, 
the Thomists together with many major men of science, such 
as Conant, Caldin, Owen, and Thompson, stand convinced that 
the experimental method cannot come to basic conclusions in 
regard to reality.
Although the advocates of the diverse kinds of 
materialism have completely overruled traditional philosophy 
as defunct and obsolete, they have been unable to obliterate 
the pressing need for philosophical speculation. As a con­
sequence, they have been forced to search in science for 
principles to serve as foundation® for their various scien­
tific constructs. In doing this they failed to recognise 
that the success of science is due to its careful obser­
vation of the limits expressed by its principles. In its 
legitimate operation, it confines itself to the quantitative 
and mechanical, and does not presume to speak about spiritual 
values and freedom; it understands that there are vast areas 
that are beyond its scope. Since this group was awed by the 
accomplishwanta and prestige of science and worshipped it
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as omniscient and omnipotent and the bearer of man* s sal­
vation, they adopted an attitude toward science which was 
strictly unscientific. To distinguish it from science 
proper it has been termed scientolafcry or scientism. Since 
the limitations of the natural sciences are ignored, this 
peculiarly modern form of idolatry claims the working 
principles of science can be used as universal principles 
in terms of which the whole of reality can be explained and 
controlled*
Since Thomistid philosophy recognises the distinction 
between philosophy and the natural sciences, it seeks to 
restore order to human thought by applying each to its proper 
part of reality. The proper techniques of the experimental 
procedure are admitted and applied to the quantitative and 
mechanical aspects of reality. But philosophy, not science, 
is admitted as the proper means for the discovery of those 
principles which enable the intellect to transcend the sen­
sory order, and to deduce truths which pertain to the basic 
principles of being. Philosophy provide® the certitude 
required for discovery and understanding of those fundamentals 
of existence such as spirituality and freedom. For, if the 
laws of logic are adhered to rigorously, the truths disco­
vered are as certain as the necessary and universal prin­
ciples from which they have been derived. An acceptance of 
the philosophy of nature opens the way for the formation of
a real knowledge of the material world beyond the scope ofx 
the experimental method.
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